

A DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS OF THE
FBI'S COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AGAINST
BLACK POLITICAL ACTIVISTS,
1968-1971

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Political repression is often associated by Americans with foreign, totalitarian nations. The existence of a national, secret political police force seems antithetical to the notion of a "free and open" democracy. Specific methods of political suppression are often simultaneously viewed by Americans with horror and relief. Horror, in that environments exist that could routinely violate basic human rights; relief, in the belief that such environments exist only in foreign countries. To indicate that this latter belief is fallacious is to say that the United States is less than the free and open democracy it is purported to be.

The maintenance of domestic peace in this society is in the hands of the military and of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. Constitutionally, on all levels, these bodies are under the authority of civilian policy makers who are supposedly answerable to the electorate. In practice, though, these agencies seem to operate in ways that are strikingly similar to methods in fascist/totalitarian nations. The policies of both appear to be the upholding of the status quo while the methods used to affect these policies seem meant to counter the activities of political dissidents.

A primary cog in America's law enforcement machinery is

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Traditionally, the Bureau has claimed that it is an apolitical federal agency; a neutral tool used by the Congress and the President to enforce the law; a passive instrument of law enforcement. But what is the basis of these claims and what exactly do they mean?

The most useful guide in defining this claim of apoliticalness was offered in 1924 by Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone. In what later became known as the Stone Standard within the Department of Justice, the overall, guiding rationale for Bureau investigatory power is offered. It says "... The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and then only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States."¹ In 1976, this standard was reiterated by the Congress during investigations into the intelligence operations of the Bureau.

Based on the Stone Standard, apolitical will be defined as unconcerned with the opinions and lawful conduct, political or otherwise, of individuals or groups. The investigation of this alleged characteristic of the FBI is the central concern of this paper.

Precisely stated, the central question this study will answer is: Did the FBI during its COINTELPRO-Black Extremists program operate in an apolitical manner? In other words, did

¹U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, Book III. 94th Congress, 2nd session, 1976, p. 23.

the policies initiated and procedures instituted by the Bureau in response to black political activity from 1968 to 1971 constitute apolitical law enforcement?

The descriptive analysis used to answer this question will be divided into two aspects. The first concern will be the development and nature of the policy that established and guided the domestic intelligence program known as COINTELPRO-Black Extremists. Defining this policy and how it evolved is essential in setting the historical context of the program. An examination of key precedents in the development of the Bureau's domestic intelligence activities will provide insight into the nature of FBI operations. A brief narration of the growth of the Bureau's counterintelligence activities along with scrutinizing the specific purposes and objectives stated at the beginning of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists should provide grounds for determining the existence of non-political law enforcement by the FBI.

The second aspect of this analysis is concerned with how the program operated to achieve its stated goals. The specific means to meet outlined objectives are surveyed along with a brief look at the individuals and organizations at whom these tactics were aimed. Were the methods used designed to apprehend lawbreakers and to collect court-acceptable evidence relevant to each case? General categorizations of tactics according to type accompanied by specific examples of actual incidents should provide further clarity as to the nature of COINTELPRO activities.

There are key terms used throughout this study will be defined here. The first term is "dissident" and will be employed interchangeably with the terms "subversive", "extremist", and "radical". This mixed use is not because the terms are synonymous in everyday usage. These terms were used by the FBI in its attempt to identify subjects whose political philosophies and activities disagreed with the dominant political perspective. Because the term dissident is insufficient, a myriad of labels was used by the Bureau to justify its investigations into dissenting politics. Bureau officials, particularly J. Edgar Hoover, believed this type of political activism to be dangerous to the national security.

Another term needing definition is "counterintelligence". This term will refer to the Bureau's attempt to disrupt, neutralize, harass, and discredit the political activities of individuals and groups labeled as threatening the domestic peace. Pragmatism guided the FBI in implementing these tactics. Legality and propriety meant little. To put it succinctly, counterintelligence methods are synonymous with "by any means necessary".

Many journal articles and books have been used as authoritative sources throughout this study. The works cited below are only a small sampling of those sources. Their fundamental importance, however, to the framework of this paper must be pointed out.

Among the journal articles found to be most helpful was Michael R. Belknap's "The Mechanics of Repression: J. Edgar Hoover, the Bureau of Investigation and the Radicals, 1917-1925" in

Crime and Social Justice. Belknap's attempt to expose the Bureau's operations against radicals during Hoover's early leadership provides a factual backdrop for understanding FBI operations today.

"Hoover's Legacy" by Frank J. Donner in The Nation picks up where Belknap's article ends. Donner is concerned with the establishment of domestic intelligence as an official activity of the Bureau. However, both authors emphasize that Hoover was personally the most influential element throughout the Bureau's evolution. Their concern is not with the institution of the FBI but rather with the institution of J. Edgar Hoover. This study differs, in that, the emphasis does not lie with Hoover's personality. Donner's sketch of the longtime FBI Director does, however, provide useful material for further understanding the agency's historical role in national security.

The usefulness of Donner's article does not stop there, though. His examination of the Bureau's intelligence investigations integrates well with a primary objective of this study, a descriptive analysis of counterintelligence in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Donner's focus on the FBI's position towards the New Left differs, however, from this paper's focus on the Bureau's actions towards black activists.

A third article, "The Government is Watching: Is There Anything the Police Don't Want to Know?" by Thomas Powers in The Atlantic provides insight into the scope of the FBI's and other agencies' intelligence activities. This article's survey of the breadth and depth of Bureau investigations helped

in limiting this study's initial concerns. A much more manageable topic resulted.

Of the books examined during the course of this study, the most helpful was FBI-An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls by Sanford J. Ungar. This work not only provides a useful and detailed history of the FBI's evolution but also several revealing portraits of officials who were keys to this development. The history that is given and the officials that are identified in this book helped in all phases of this study by providing a broad, factual base from which to work.

One of the many things encountered while reviewing the literature was that many of the works were colored by either a very negative or very positive attitude held by the author towards the FBI. Few could be labeled as impartial. Sanford's FBI, although critical, is an example of a somewhat unbiased approach. Don Whitehead's The FBI Story: A Report to the People is an example of a very positive attitude. His account is so positive, in fact, that J. Edgar Hoover saw fit to write the book's foreword.

The FBI Story is important to this study, in that it is the first time that Hoover gives a detailed account of his confidential 1936 executive directive giving the Bureau the alleged authority to conduct domestic intelligence. Whitehead does not hesitate to provide a platform from which Hoover could justify the FBI activities during the McCarthy era.

Investigating the FBI, a book that was edited by Pat Waters and Stephen Gillers, is, on the other hand, a very critical

study of the agency's history and policies. The condemnations this book offers are most useful because certain facts come to light that would have remained hidden. For instance, chapter three's analysis of the Bureau's budget concludes that because of the lack of normal controls the budget is a source of much of the agency's abuse of power. Overall, the book concentrates on Hoover's last years with the Bureau. It also offers extensive documentation for areas useful to this study.

Among the federal government documents that were essential to the documentation in this study were the reports of the House of Representatives' Committee on the Judiciary's subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. The two reports that were found to be most helpful were the FBI Counterintelligence Programs and FBI Oversight. The former contains the "Petersen Report", an intradepartmental look at COINTELPRO. The latter report contains a cost/benefit analysis of FBI domestic intelligence by the General Accounting Office.

The Senate Select Intelligence Committee chaired by Frank Church (D-Idaho) also provides valuable reports. Particularly, Books II, III, and IV of the committee's final report reveals the attitudes held by most of the Congress towards remedies for problems detected by their investigations. This body's findings and recommendations are briefly reviewed later in this paper.

The collection of data for this study will involve both primary and secondary materials. Secondary sources will be relied upon for the construction of the historical context of the Bureau's domestic intelligence activities. Books and articles,

written by political scientists and historians, regarding the evolution of the FBI and its domestic intelligence policy will also be employed.

The accuracy of these secondary sources will be checked by comparing the accounts of several writers. No facts will be presented in this paper unless corroborated. Also, by comparing various historical works, a representative extraction of facts is more likely.

The primary sources expected to be examined are memorandas, letters, and progress reports exchanged between the FBI field offices and FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. during the counterintelligence efforts involving black activists. Several thousand pages of documents have been released under the Freedom of Information Act and are available in the J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building in Washington, D.C. A small sample of these documents were xeroxed and placed in the Appendix of this paper.

Other governmental documents to be used include materials submitted to various executive and legislative bodies as they attempted to assess the nature and activities of COINTELPRO. The materials include staff reports; testimonies of various officials involved with the program; descriptive analysis of the programs activities; judgments regarding the propriety of the Bureau's policy and actions; and recommendations regarding any future counterintelligence activities.

It is not believed that the government has made all materials relevant to COINTELPRO public. However, enough material has been released as to allow an accurate portrayal of the FBI's

activities during the era of COINTELPRO.

The methodology utilized in this study involves an exhaustive descriptive analysis involving techniques of document analysis, historical research, and illustrative examples.

The systematic search for materials will include the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, the card catalogs of libraries, and abstracts indexing Congressional proceedings investigating the FBI. The bibliographies of books and articles dealing with the Bureau should also prove to be most helpful in locating relevant materials.

Once materials have been located and following a gleaning of pertinent facts, classifications will be made according to information contributing to: (1) the program's historical context; (2) COINTELPRO's policy characteristics; and (3) descriptions of the tactics used during the program.

Following this classification process, this study will assess the character of the program's historical beginnings and operations. The Stone Standard is the basis of this assessment. Whether it can be said that the FBI's counterintelligence program against black activists operated in an apolitical manner will depend on the extent to which the information gathered supports the Bureau's position of being unconcerned with the lawful opinions and conduct of black activists whose energies were directed at the government.

The paper's format will follow this outline:

Chapter I.	Introduction
Chapter II.	The Basis of COINTELPRO
Chapter III.	The Policy and Mechanics of COINTELPRO
Chapter IV.	Concluding Assessments of COINTELPRO

The conclusion of this study is expected to offer an accurate portrayal of FBI operations during COINTELPRO-Black Extremists. It is hoped that this paper will act as a preliminary study to future inquiries into the role federal law enforcement plays in the black community.

CHAPTER II

THE BASIS OF COINTELPRO

The Bureau of Investigation, the immediate forerunner of the modern Federal Bureau of Investigation, was established in 1908 as a permanent detective force that would enable the Department of Justice to effectively investigate land frauds and antitrust violations. The Bureau's main proponent, Charles Bonaparte, Attorney General of the United States under President Theodore Roosevelt, argued that "a Department of Justice with no force of permanent police in any form under its control is assuredly not fully equipped for its work."¹ Congress responded by authorizing funds to be used for investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Justice Department.

Significant expansions of the Bureau came quickly. In 1910, the agency was authorized to enforce the White Slave Traffic Act, also known as the Mann Act, which prohibited interstate transportation of women for the purpose of prostitution.² Because of the wide application of the law and the broad interpretation given it by the Supreme Court, the Mann Act had a

¹Sanford J. Ungar, FBI-An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1976), p. 39.

²U.S. Congress, Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI vol. VI, hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. 94th, Congress, 1st session, p. 548.

significant, longrange impact on the Bureau in that its manpower was dramatically increased.³

Another noteworthy development in the early evolution of the Bureau came during the World War I years. During this time the agency began to function as a political police force. The statutory authorization for this role was granted by the Espionage and Sedition Acts which criminalized a wide range of utterances and publications critical of the government and its policies. The Trading with the Enemy Act and the Selective Service and Training Act also worked to expand the agency's political police power. The Bureau's interests were no longer limited to traditional areas of criminal investigation but, with the passage of these acts, were broadened to cover matters concerning internal security and national defense.⁴

At this time the Bureau had about 400 agents but these were not capable of adequately handling the duties assigned. Justice Department officials turned to "a volunteer organization of loyal citizens", the American Protective League, to assist the overloaded Bureau.⁵ As a result of this union, during three days of massive raids in New York and Newark, 50,000 men were arrested simply because they did not have a draft card in their possession. The Bureau's intent was to apprehend

³Ungar, FBI, pp. 40-41.

⁴Michael R. Belknap, "The Mechanics of Repression: J. Edgar Hoover, The Bureau of Investigation and the Radicals, 1917-1925," Crime and Social Justice, No. 7 (Spring/Summer 1977), p. 49.

⁵Ungar, FBI, p. 42.

men who had failed to register for the draft. However, only one in every two hundred turned out to be a genuine draft-dodger.⁶ As a result, the experiment with civilian vigilantes ended but the control of unpatriotic elements remained as one of the Bureau's guiding principles.

This principle was most infamously illustrated by the 'Red Raids' which later became known as the 'Palmer Raids' in honor of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. In response to bombings and bomb scares, the Bureau of Investigation in cooperation with the Immigration Service staged simultaneous raids in eleven cities on meetings of various union and political organizations who were considered dangerous and anarchistic in light of the Red-Radical Scare of 1917-1921. The Federation of the Union of Russian Workers, the Socialist Party, the Industrial Workers of the World, and the Communist Party were primary targets of the raids. The arrests, harassment, and legal proceedings which followed the raids shattered the American Communist movement but the Bureau continued to insist during Congressional appropriation hearings that radicalism was growing stronger every day and that unless the country became aroused the situation would become very serious.⁷ Even though Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in 1921 revealed discrepancies in the search warrants, illegal arrests, and perjury on the part of Palmer in giving testimony to previous Congress-

⁶U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p.549.

⁷Belknap, "Mechanics of Repression," p. 51.

sional investigations of the raids, Congress responded not by condemning the illegalities Attorney General Palmer authorized but by sanctioning the raids as necessary measures taken against alien anarchists. Only three Senators dissented resulting in opposing committee reports being printed in the Congressional Record.⁸

The Palmer Raids are noteworthy in this study not only because they helped set a precedent for the Bureau's role as a governmental political force but they also introduced a young law school graduate as head of the General Intelligence Division of the Bureau. During the Senate investigations of the raids, John (Edagr) Hoover appeared along with Palmer to defend the agency's actions. Hoover eventually became the primary catalyst by which the Department of Justice repressed dissident political views.

Soon after the Senate investigations, the new President, Warren Harding replaced Attorney General Palmer with Harry Daugherty who, in turn, appointed William J. Burns as the Director of the Bureau of Investigation. With Burns at the helm, the Bureau's budget rose by \$250,000; Hoover was made Assistant Director; and the investigation and repression of domestic radicalism increased.⁹ Under Burns the Bureau became involved on the state level with the investigation and

⁸Vern Countryman, "The History of the FBI: Democracy's Development of a Secret Police," in Pat Watters and Stephen Gil-
lers (eds.), Investigating the FBI (New York: Doubleday & Co.,
Inc., 1973), p. 48.

Belknap, "Mechanics of Repression," p. 51.

prosecution of the noncriminal, political activities of socialists and communists. Assisted by increased use of informants planted deep within radical organizations, the Bureau again conducted raids aimed at further destroying the movements. Despite the lack of jurisdiction on the state level, Bureau agents made arrests and pressed for the conviction of dissidents around the nation.

Upon the death of Harding, President Calvin Coolidge appointed a civil libertarian as the new Attorney General, Harlan Fiske Stone. Stone's philosophy clashed with that of his predecessors and in his attempt to revamp the Bureau, he accepted the resignation of Director Burns and in December 1924, made Hoover, then twenty-nine years old, Director of the Bureau. In order to secure this position, Hoover enthusiastically abandoned the policies he had helped implement while Palmer and Burns headed the Bureau. The new Director embarked on a ten year drive to rid the Bureau of incompetents, to increase administrative efficiency and to concentrate exclusively on the enforcement of various federal laws on interstate crime.

Prior to Hoover's rebuilding, the Bureau's recruitment of agents was not geared at selecting the best qualified. The party affiliations and political connections of individuals along with specific recommendations from various congressmen had been the primary means of selecting agents for the Bureau.¹⁰ These practices in addition to the low rate of prosecution had

¹⁰Ungar, FBI, p. 46.

recipient of positive public notice and expanded responsibilities. By 1935, the Bureau of Investigation, renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), had become a most important cog in federal law enforcement.

This importance was exemplified on August 24, 1936, when Hoover was called to the White House for a conference with President Franklin Roosevelt. This was the first of three conferences that led to federal investigation "of the subversive activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and Communism."¹³

It was decided at the meetings that the FBI would coordinate intelligence investigations with the War Department's Military Intelligence Division, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the State Department. The investigations were to be for intelligence purposes only, and not the type of investigations required in collecting evidence for court presentation.¹⁴ This was the first time since the Red Hunts of the 1920s that the Bureau participated in the search for subversives, i.e. Nazis and Communists. Federal lawbreaking was again joined by dissident ideology and behavior as primary concerns of the FBI.

On September 5, 1936, a memorandum went to all FBI field offices. In part it said,

The Bureau desires to obtain from all possible sources information concerning subversive activities being conducted

¹³Ibid., p. 560. These meetings were to remain secret until 1956 when Hoover released, through a personal interview, the memoranda he wrote immediately after the conferences supplemented by his recollection of the conversations that took place.

¹⁴Don Whitehead, The FBI Story: A Report to the People (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 157-159.

had created an agency that was one of the most discredited in Washington, D.C.

During this reconstruction period, Attorney General Stone affirmed the apolitical stance of the Bureau. He stated that

the Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and then only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which it should be our first concern to cherish.¹¹

The investigation of radical activities was subsequently limited during the late 1920s and early 1930s. Such investigations were conducted only for specific purposes when requested by the Attorney General and Secretary of State under the provisions of the Appropriations Act, 28 USC 533 (3).¹² It is held by most authors that from 1924 to 1934, the Bureau conducted general domestic radical investigations where the activity indicated that there had been a violation of the federal laws and where investigations were requested by the State Department through the Attorney General.

During this time of low profile for the Bureau, Hoover supervised two important developments. First, the passage of six special crime bills which transformed offenses only punishable on the state level into federal crimes. These bills paved the way for federal investigations of organized crime while also allowing for a significant increase in the Bureau's facilities and manpower. Secondly, the Bureau under Hoover became the

¹¹Ibid., p. 49

¹²U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p. 554.

in the United States by Communists, Fascists, and representatives or advocates of other organizations or groups advocating the overthrow or replacement of the Government of the United States by illegal methods. No investigation should be initiated into cases of this kind in the absence of specific authorization from the Bureau, but you should forward to the Bureau information obtained from all sources¹⁵

As a result of this new responsibility, the number of espionage cases investigated by the FBI increased from an average of 35 per year from 1933 to 1937, to 250 cases in 1938 alone.¹⁶ These confidential investigations covered the following general areas: the maritime industry; government affairs; the steel industry; the coal industry; the newspaper field; the clothing, garment, and fur industry; general strike activities of Communist and affiliated organizations; Fascist and anti-fascist movements; and the activities of organized labor organizations.¹⁷

The importance of the 1936 directive to present claims of the FBI for its authority to initiate policy and conduct domestic intelligence is vital. The FBI holds that statements attributed to President Roosevelt in 1936 authorized and directed it to conduct domestic intelligence investigations of subversives and their activities. However, two important questions arise regarding this alleged directive. First, are the August 24 and 25, 1936 memorandums from Hoover reliable? The documents serve as the lone basis upon which later powers are claimed. Second, if these memorandums are reliable what are the exact parameters

¹⁵U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p. 562.

¹⁶Whitehead, The FBI Story, p. 162.

¹⁷U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p. 563.

of the Bureau's jurisdiction?

Hoover's credibility has proven to be less than 100% reliable when he perceived threats to the national security. For instance, during Congressional hearings after his death critics pointed out that he deceived Attorneys General, Presidents and the public when he felt it necessary. The surfacing of these memorandums in 1956 could have been such a time. In addition to this, there has been confusion over what was exactly to be investigated. The only activities specifically mentioned were those involving Fascism and Communism. Because of the limited area open to the FBI in the investigation of subversives by the Roosevelt directive, no legal basis can be found here for the expanded coverage of intelligence operations during the COINTELPRO era. Despite this weakness, the FBI claims the 1936 directive as the modern basis for its authority to conduct such operations. Subsequent executive directives regarding the FBI's authority to conduct domestic intelligence are based upon the alleged precedent set by Roosevelt.

On June 26, 1939. another confidential directive was issued by the President. It stated that "the Investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation..."¹⁸

The heads of the Intelligence Division of the War Depart-

¹⁸U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, FBI Oversight, hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, serial No. 2, part 2, 94th Congress, 1st session, p. 165. These hearings further documented the FBI's need for a charter that explicitly states congressionally approved areas for its authority. As to this date, however, no such charter has been approved.

ment and the Navy along with the Director of the FBI were to form an Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee. The President also ordered that no other agencies were to investigate any "of these specified matters and that all other government agencies should report subversive activities to the nearest office of the FBI".¹⁹

This directive was made public on September 6, 1939. The statement issued by the President repeated what had been confidentially ordered in June. But it also requested that all "law enforcement officers in the United States promptly...turn over to the nearest representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and violations of the neutrality laws."²⁰

The June and September directives served to coordinate activities and affix responsibilities upon the FBI for more effective intelligence operations.²¹ Up to this time there had been no central coordinating body that could be held responsible for this type of work. Yet, the question raised earlier remains. What were the boundaries of the Bureau's authority?

Three subsequent Presidential directives regarding the FBI and the control of subversive activities merely reaffirm the principles established in 1939. They do not work to clarify the

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰U.S. President, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt Vol. 8 (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1941), p. 478, 479.

²¹U.S. House, FBI Oversight, pp. 165-167.

situation because they do not define specifically clouded areas of the Roosevelt directives. President Harry Truman's directive of July 24, 1950 reiterates the same points made by Roosevelt. President Dwight Eisenhower's December 15, 1953 directive pointed back to its predecessors and differed only by referring to a legislative act as a basis for the assigned responsibilities. Violations of the Atomis Energy Act were specified as crimes deserving the intelligence practices of the FBI. Nowhere in any of the directives is explicit authority delegated to the FBI in conducting intelligence investigations of domestic political dissidents.²²

Can such authority be found in legislative enactments? According to documents submitted before the House of Representatives' investigative committee on FBI oversight and to memorandas circulated within the Department of Justice, such authority is , at best, ambiguously stated and, at worst, interpreted in ways that violate the constitutional and civil rights of individuals and groups targeted for intelligence investigations.²³

The statutes commonly cited by the FBI as granting it authority to conduct domestic intelligence activities are to be found in Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code (USC). Title 18 provides a list of crimes that fell within the Bureau's alleged jurisdiction. For example, rebellion or insurrection

²²See U.S. Presidents, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1950, 1963), Harry S Truman, 1950, p. 545 and Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, p. 830.

²³U.S. Senate, FBI Intelligence Activities of the FBI, pp. 541-544 and House, FBI Oversight, pp. 167-170.

is prohibited by section 2383; seditious conspiracy by section 2384; while section 2385 outlaws the advocacy of the overthrow of the government.

Title 28, section 533 authorizes the Attorney General to appoint officials that will "detect and prosecute" crimes against the United States. The FBI asserts that its agents are the aforementioned officials.²⁴

The problem with this "statutory authority" is that the scope, functions, and objectives of the Bureau's domestic counter-intelligence program are not outlined. In 28 USC 533, for example, a precise definition of a key phrase, "detect and prosecute", is lacking. Does it mean longterm surveillance of individuals and groups in order to discover if crimes have been committed that could lead to prosecution? Or do the statutes authorize the harassment and disruption of domestic dissidents deemed dangerous by the FBI?

The unclear legislative intent allows questionable interpretive processes to be used by Bureau officials in determining the nature of their intelligence operations. Policies formed by that process have traditionally followed a stance believed to be pragmatic by FBI officials. These pragmatic policies are seldom subject to review by anyone outside of the Bureau.²⁵

The lack of a definitive executive or legislative mandate determining the intelligence jurisdiction of the Bureau along with critical shifts in the political atmosphere provided fer-

²⁴U.S. House, FBI Oversight, pp. 167-171.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 167-168.

tile ground for the development of what became officially known as COINTELPRO. This is a generic term used to describe what developed into seven separate counterintelligence programs. The FBI implemented these programs at different times during the years of 1956 to 1971, when all were supposedly discontinued.²⁶

The development of these programs integrated well with the Bureau's policies and activities regarding the domestic security responsibilities assumed after the 1936 executive directive. Included in its efforts to take charge of its 'mandate', the FBI began compiling information about individuals whose liberty "in time of war or national emergency would be dangerous to the public peace and the safety of the United States Governemnt."²⁷ This "suspect list" was composed of individuals who exhibited Nazi or Communist tendencies. These and other "potentially dangerous" individuals were to be held in "custodial detention" pending investigation in the event of a national emergency.²⁸

In 1943, after four years of compiling and classifying names according to "individual danger classifications", a new Attorney General, Francis Biddle, ordered the end of the Custodial Detention List.²⁹ Biddle felt that the classifications

²⁶Most sources agree that questionable tactics used during this period continued informally after the programs were supposedly ended in 1971. These sources include the New York Times, the Washington Post, and several investigatory committees of Congress.

²⁷U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p. 409.

²⁸U.S. House, FBI Oversight, p. 189. See also Carolina Rose and Ken Lawrence, J. Edgar Hoover's Detention Plan: The Politics of Repression in the U.S., 1939-1976 (Jackson, Mississippi: American Friends Service Committee, 1978).

²⁹U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, pp.412-413.

served no useful purpose and that the practice had "no statutory authority or other present justification." He also stated that the classification system was "inherently unreliable" because

The evidence used for the purpose of making classifications was inadequate; the standards applied to the evidence for the purpose of making the classifications were defective; and finally, the notion that it is possible to make a valid determination as to how dangerous a person is in the abstract, and without reference to time, environment, and other relevant circumstances, is impractical, unwise, and dangerous.³⁰

FBI Director Hoover, however, effectively avoided his superior's direct order. The listing and use of the list was not discontinued by the Bureau. Instead, it was renamed the Security Index and no evidence exists that shows that the FBI advised the Attorney General it maintained the index.³¹ In fact, Hoover directed the Special Agents-in-Charge (SACs) of FBI field offices in a strictly confidential letter to merely no longer use the phrase "custodial detention" and to replace its reference with the term "Security Index". He further directed the field office heads to keep the existence of the Security Index "strictly confidential". FBI officials were at "no time to mention or allude to in investigative reports or discuss with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau" the maintenance of this material.³²

³⁰Ibid., p. 412.

³¹U.S. House, FBI Oversight, p. 189.

³²U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, pp. 414-415. Hoover's circumvention of his superior's policies is not only illustrative of his methods of administering the Bureau but also serves as further basis for understanding the nature of COINTELPRO.

By 1949, the Department of Justice reversed its official position regarding custodial detention thereby again providing sanction of the Security Index.³³ By the mid-1950s, the Cold War and McCarthyism had stretched the measures to preserve the status quo to extraordinary dimensions. These measures included the initiation of COINTELPRO by the FBI. This program was hindsightedly justified by a former Bureau Official. He said, "Hence, just as a soldier on a field of battle did not consider it wrong to kill the enemy, so too, on the home front it was not considered wrong in major cases to use extraordinary measures in security work...both had the same goal---vanquish the enemy."³⁴

During the 1950s, the "enemy was the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). During the 1960s, the list of enemies increased dramatically. The tactics used against these enemies followed the model established by the COINTELPRO-CPUSA. The enemies generally fell into the following categories around which counterintelligence programs were officially conducted: in 1956, the forerunner of all other COINTELPROs began against the Communist Party; the Socialist Workers Party became

³³Documents do not indicate why the reversal occurred. However, I speculate that the exit of Attorney General Biddle, the influence of Hoover's own politics and the shift from the World War against Fascism to the Cold War against Communism had much to do with it.

³⁴William C. Sullivan, former Assistant Director of the FBI, "personal Observations and Recommendations on Privacy", U.S. House of Representatives, Surveillance, hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 94th Congress, 1st session, 1975, p. 724.

a COINTELPRO subject officially in 1961; in 1964, "White Hate Groups" became an enemy; "Black Extremists" qualified in 1967; and operations against the "New Left" were officially inaugurated in 1968. Two other COINTELPROs were in the area of foreign espionage within the United States.

The primary interest of this study's remaining text will be the FBI's activities and policies composing the COINTELPRO-Black Extremists. The term "Black Extremists" was a term broadly used to include those involved with the civil rights movement, urban riots, and other factors seen as threatening to the domestic peace.

Counterintelligence activities against black activists began to take official form in the summer of 1967. In response to concerns that the urban riots were attributable to a conspiracy to cause general disorder, Hoover ordered the creation of the Rabble-Rouser Index. Its purpose was to follow the activities of individuals who had demonstrated by their actions and speeches "a propensity for fomenting disorders of a racial and/or security nature." The index was also "to provide: (1) a ready reference in the field and at the Bureau to specified personal data and (2) a short summary of activities of indexed subjects indicating a propensity for violence."³⁵ As can be readily seen, the maintenance of the Security Index provided the basis for this index.

Originally, the Rabble-Rouser Index included only individuals recognized nationally. But by November 1967, it was

³⁵U.S. House, FBI Oversight, p. 192.

felt by the Bureau officials that "the national security problems created by local activists had grown sufficiently to warrant including them in the index." In March 1968, 250 persons were listed on the index. During 1969, the total increased to 700 names. By October 1970, 1,131 persons appeared on what had been renamed the Agitator Index.³⁶

A second category of programs that preceeded and supplemented counterintelligence operations against persons involved in the black political movement were known as the Key Activist and Key Extremist programs. There were primarily two features that distinguished these programs from the Agitator Index. First, the Agitator Index provided only basic vital information on a subject while the latter programs involved exhaustive investigatory means which yielded information on the day-to-day activities of subjects and their future plans for staging demonstrations and other anti-government activities.

Secondly, the Key Activist and Key Extremist programs were concerned with only the most active of the agitators. For example, the Key Activist program had, at its peak, 76 individuals under investigation while the Key Extremist program had 90 persons when it was at its peak.³⁷ Even though both were used to supplement the counterintelligence tactics used against subjects, neither program was discontinued when COINTELPRO was officially terminated in 1971. These programs, characterized by their in-

³⁶Ibid., pp. 191-192.

³⁷Ibid., p. 193. The difference between the Key Activist program and the Key Extremist program was only the subjects being investigated. Both used the same methods of investigation and both had the same objectives.

tensive investigative practices, were not ended until February 1975.

Both the Agitator Index and the Key Activist and Key Extremist programs supplemented the domestic security efforts of the FBI by pinpointing individuals and groups as targets for counterintelligence activities. Originally, these efforts to disrupt, expose, and neutralize targeted subjects were limited, in the Roosevelt era, to agents of foreign governments and their sympathizers.³⁸ The targeting of domestic groups for these counterintelligence efforts is the distinguishing characteristic of COINTELPRO. How this was done and what policies guided this program will be examined in the next section of this study.

³⁸U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, FBI Counterintelligence Programs, testimony of William B. Saxbe before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, p. 11.

CHAPTER III

THE POLICY AND MECHANICS OF COINTELPRO

In portraying the nature of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists it is essential that the official policies that guided the program be examined. The purpose of this section is to do that along with characterizing the specific means by which these policies were carried out. The specific means to be described include the FBI's administrative apparatus, its lines of responsibility, and the type of tactics employed against the program's targets.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's structural composition consists of thirteen operating divisions. The divisions range from the well known Identification Division which maintains millions of fingerprints to the Intelligence Division which is responsible for national security investigations in foreign and domestic intelligence matters. This latter division was responsible for directing and coordinating, with direct approval of the Director, the operations known within the Bureau as COINTELPRO.

The Intelligence Division is composed of two branches. The Counterintelligence Branch is concerned with the activities of unfriendly foreign governments within the United States. The Internal Security Branch is responsible for the supervision and coordination of investigatory matters involving black, white,

Hispanic, and Native American "extremists". This branch's jurisdiction specifically covers sedition, sabotage, civil unrest and acts of violence, and the activities of revolutionary groups and organizations. It was this branch that administered COINTELPRO.¹

The responsibilities of the Internal Security Branch of the Intelligence Division were distributed among three sections labeled the Extremist Section, the Subversive Section, and the Research Section. The Extremist Section is responsible for policy formulation as it provides guidance to field offices in the investigatory area of extremists. This section is also accountable for handling racial matters involving riots, demonstrations and other acts of civil disobedience. The Extremist Section also determines whether there are Communist influences among targeted groups and individuals. The development of extremist informants is fundamental to the successful operations of this section, particularly in regards to COINTELPRO.²

The Subversive Section of the Internal Security Branch has six primary functions: (1) supervising investigations relating to the activities of revolutionary Communist organizations and individuals; (2) investigating revolutionary fugitives who have been allegedly involved with terrorist activities; (3) developing and utilizing subversive informants; (4) formulating policy to be followed by the field offices on subversive matters; (5) initiating and reviewing the results of subversive

¹Ungar, FBI, the front and back inside cover pages.

²U.S. House, FBI Oversight, p. 163.

programs and investigations and providing relevant information to government officials and agencies; (6) maintaining the FBI's Administrative Index, which is identical to the Security Index described in Chapter II. This index consists of the identification and location of radical individuals considered by the Bureau as being "extremely dangerous".³

The third portion of the Internal Security Branch is the Research Section. It serves the entire Intelligence Division by preparing research papers and analysis on broad intelligence areas. The responsibilities of this section also include preparing requests for authorizing electronic surveillance. The importance of this section cannot be played down because among its other duties are: (1) serving as instructors and setting up schools for agents before they are assigned to counterintelligence work; and (2) advising the FBI on how Congressional bills and legislation will affect the Intelligence Division.⁴

The Internal Security Branch, though, is just a portion of the multilevel nature of the Bureau's COINTELPRO operations. The policy of headquarters coordination of investigations initiated by the field offices illustrates the effort of FBI officials to rigidly keep lines of authority clearly marked. No policy could be made and actualized without the approval of at least the Assistant Director. COINTELPRO was not a freak phenomenon whose existence was known only among a few maverick field offices.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., pp. 163-164.

COINTELPRO was planned and promoted at the highest level within the Bureau while being carried out through the Intelligence Division by all fifty-nine field offices.

In fact, upon instituting the COINTELPRO aimed at "Black Nationalist-Hate Groups", the Director of the FBI ordered, "No counterintelligence action under this program may be initiated by the Field without specific prior Bureau authorization." Underlines in the original ⁵

In a February 29, 1968 memorandum designed to expand the counterintelligence program to include forty-one field offices, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan approved further strengthening of the lines of responsibility. Accountability for counterintelligence activities directed against Black Nationalist-Hate Groups had two major aspects. First, as in the August 25, 1967 letter, all actions taken against targeted individuals and groups must be approved by the Bureau. Second, progress letters summarizing counterintelligence operations must be submitted every ninety days to the Bureau headquarters.⁶

The ninety-day progress letter became characteristic of how the COINTELPRO activities were administered. These letters contained information that fell under the following captions:
(1) Operations Under Consideration; (2) Operations Being Effectuated; (3) Tangible Results; and (4) Development of Counterintelligence

⁵See Appendix, Memorandum to William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director of the FBI in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division from George C. Moore, Intelligence Division Supervisor of Black Nationalist Affairs, on February 29, 1968.

⁶Ibid.

Interest.⁷ In these reports, the SACs were expected to evaluate the effectiveness of approved investigations, as well as acknowledge their compliance with headquarters instructions regarding the parameters of their activities.

Bureau approval for proposed COINTELPRO activities resulted only after inspection and evaluation on many levels. For example, after a report or a request for approval of a certain activity was received from a field office it may have gone through as many as six levels of superiors before it was finally approved. In certain sensitive operations, approval came from as high as the Director's desk.⁸

Instructions sent to the field offices upon their initiation of counterintelligence activities were illustrative of the tight control Bureau headquarters required. Every move made by the field offices were to be reported to the Bureau. The preliminary steps towards the formation of COINTELPROs in the various field offices were to follow orders given by Sullivan's Intelligence Division. Those steps directed the SAC to submit to Bureau headquarters "a very succinct summary of the Black nationalist movement in the field office territory". To be included in this "succinct summary" were the names, number of members, and degree of activity of each black nationalist group; an estimation "of each group's propensity for violence"; and a list of Rabble-Rouser Index subjects who could be targets for current or future counterintelligence action.⁹

⁷Ibid.

⁸U.S. House, FBI Oversight, pp. 175-177.

⁹February 29, 1968 Memo from W.C. Sullivan from G.C. Moore.

The overall goals of COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist-Hate Groups¹⁰ acted as the guidelines for all operations. These goals were first briefly outlined in the August 25, 1967 letter and later reiterated in the February 29, 1968 memorandum. In general, the objectives of the program were to use the FBI's resources to disrupt the groups and to counter perceived threats to the national security.¹¹

The five long-range goals set for COINTELPRO-Black Extremists were designed to provide maximum effectiveness in exchange for a minimal amount of effort. Specifically, the first goal was to "prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups." The Bureau felt that "an effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step towards a real 'Mau Mau' in America, the beginning of a true black revolution."¹²

The second goal was to "prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify, and electrify the militant black nationalist movement." Four individuals were considered to be enough of a threat for this position that officials felt it necessary that they be immediately targeted for neutralization. These targets were the memory of Malcolm X, who was considered by the Bureau as the movement's martyr; Elijah Muhammed, whose age somewhat lessened his potential; Martin Luther King, Jr., the individual seen by the FBI as "a very real contender for this position should he

¹⁰This title was used interchangeably with COINTELPRO-Black Extremists.

¹¹U.S. House, FBI Oversight, pp. 175-177.

¹²February 29, 1968 memo to W.C. Sullivan from G.C. Moore, particularly p. 3.

abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white liberal doctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism"; and Stokely Carmichael, whose personal charisma qualified him as a "real threat".¹³

The third aim of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists was to "prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups." FBI officials directed that counterintelligence activities should "pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence."¹⁴

The next objective of the program was to "prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community." This goal was tactically directed at : (1) "the responsible Negro community"; (2) the responsible white community and at white "'liberals' who have vestiges of sympathy for the militant black nationalists simply because they are Negroes"; and (3) Negro radicals, the followers of the movement.¹⁵

The fifth and final goal stated by Bureau policymakers was aimed at preventing the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organization, especially among youth. Field offices were directed to develop specific tactics to prevent groups from converting young people.¹⁶

The counterintelligence program against black extremists

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., note pp. 3-4.

¹⁶Ibid., note p. 4.

was justified in February 29, 1968 memorandum. The deployment of intelligence activities against domestic groups was believed to be necessary in light of the "tremendous increase in black nationalist activity". Such activity was seen as dangerous to the national security.¹⁷ The Bureau's COINTELPRO efforts were further rationalized by William B. Saxbe, Attorney General of the United States, in Congressional testimony on November 22, 1974. In regards to why COINTELPRO-Black Extremists was instituted and maintained by the FBI, Saxbe asserted that "...the activities of these extremists were marked by violence, arson and bombings" and that "the activities of many of these extremist groups included police shootings and, as is well known, the fostering and fomenting of riots and other civil disturbances in cities all across the land." Saxbe coupled these alleged black nationalist activities with the assertion that "these activities were led by or included individuals who publicly proclaimed their association with the political doctrines or leadership of hostile countries, including Communist nations"¹⁸

Saxbe's rationale, however, ignores the primary purpose of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists as stated by the FBI Director on August 25, 1967. The program's efforts were not based on the supposedly apolitical nature of FBI law enforcement as he implies. The Bureau's aims were meant to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and grouping, their lead-

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸U.S. House, FBI Counterintelligence Programs, p. 11.

ership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters..."¹⁹ The Director's statement represents the Bureau's position that individuals and organizations were subject to federal counterintelligence efforts because of their political beliefs and activities not because of criminal behavior as specified by the law.

The tactics used to achieve the goals of COINTELPRO help to further illustrate how criminal detection and apprehension were not the Bureau's primary motivation. Assistant Director Sullivan mildly characterized the program's methods as "...pragmatic: will it work; will it get the necessary results? The primacy of civil liberties on occasion gave way to expediency."²⁰

FBI documents indicate that most of the tactics used fell into twelve specific categories as reported by Assistant Attorney General Petersen.²¹ These categories and examples for each are given below.

Firstly, anonymous or fictitious materials were sent to groups or their individual members. This tactic was primarily designed to prevent the unification of different organizations along with creating factionalism within targeted groups. It is estimated that 40% of the Bureau's COINTELPRO efforts were of this type.²² An example of this tactic can be seen on a memorandum dated 4/1/68 from the SAC in New York to the Director of the FBI. The SAC requested permission to send a letter to

¹⁹August 25, 1967 letter to SACs from the Director of the FBI.

²⁰Sullivan, "Personal Observations and Recommendations on Privacy", p. 726.

²¹U.S. House, FBI Oversight, pp. 198-199.

²²U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities & the Rights of Americans, p. 40.

H. Rap Brown that was designed to plant seeds of distrust between Brown, Carmichael, and Forman. As soon as Brown was to get out of jail the following letter was to be sent to him:

Dear Rap:

Dig this man. I got it from inside. STOKELY and FORMAN sent you to the West Coast so that the man would get you. They are a little too cool for you RAP Baby. With you out of the way they can have the whole pie.
SOUL BROTHER

Secondly, another popular tactic involved giving information or articles to "friendly" media sources who could be relied upon not to reveal the FBI's interests. The purpose of this tactic was to expose targeted groups to unfavorable publicity thus affecting their efforts to gain allies, members, and finances. A memorandum dated February 26, 1971 from SAC in New Haven to the FBI Director, for example, shows proposed actions to be taken against the Black Panther Party (BPP) in New Haven. One action was to send a letter to the editor of the New Haven Register along with an article supposedly released by Associated Press that would negatively portray the living style of Huey P. Newton while also denying the BPP's claim that the police were out to kill BPP members.²⁴

Thirdly, the Bureau would also leak informant-based or nonpublic information to media sources. This tactic usually attempted to discredit the target by exposing its nature, aims, and membership to the public as interpreted by the FBI. A

²³See Appendix, Memorandum dated 4/1/68 from SAC in New York; Memorandum dated 4/4/68 from SAC in Jackson; and an Airtel dated 2/10/71 from SAC in Newark.

²⁴See Appendix, Airtel on 2/1/68 from SAC in Boston; Airtel on 3/18/68 from SAC in Atlanta; and Memorandum on February 26, 1971 from SAC in New Haven.

prime example of how this tactic took form can be seen in a memorandum sent to the FBI Director from the SAC in New Orleans on 3/28/68. As a disruptive tactic aimed at the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the New Orleans field office proposed to contact a "trusted source in one of the wire services such as AP or UPI" who could see to the national distribution of an article claiming SNCC had raised more than the \$30,000 necessary to free H. Rap Brown on bail. The article would go on to question what SNCC did with the money in the hope of causing dissension within the black community.²⁵

Fourthly, normally advising local, state, and federal authorities of civil and criminal violations by individuals would not be considered beyond the expected duties of the FBI. However, such practices were among the COINTELPRO methods and cannot be considered as expected duties. The disruption and harassment of targets were frequently the purposes as this tactic was utilized. Memphis, for example, members of the BPP and other leftist groups were harassed and arrested by the local police on the basis of evidence supplied by the Bureau. As a result of these arrests a free breakfast program was successfully disrupted.²⁶

Fifthly, FBI informants were often used as agents provocateur. They often disrupted a group's activities by causing dissension or exploiting disputes. These agents were often

²⁵See Appendix, Memorandum dated 3/28/68 from SAC in New Orleans; and a letter on 8/5/68 from SAC in Albany.

²⁶See Appendix, Memorandum on April 5, 1968 from SAC Denver; and a Memorandum dated 2/26/71 from SAC in Memphis.

instigators of confrontations with local law enforcement agencies. Two examples of this tactic are found in a teletype dated February 13, 1971 from the San Francisco field office to the Director and in a memorandum dated 3/1/71 from the SAC in Houston to the FBI Director. These communications respectively state that the leadership of the BPP was in disruption because of the suspicion that there was an informer within the ministry while in Houston the Peoples Party II leader was killed in a shootout with the police. It was believed by many that the shootout was set up by informers.²⁷

Sixthly, employers of targeted individuals were often approached in attempts by the Bureau to get targets fired or to pressure them to stop their activities. The Bureau, in one instance, contacted the bishop of a Catholic priest that allowed his church to be used in the breakfast program of the local chapter of the BPP. As a result of this contact, the priest was transferred.²⁸

Seventhly, another ploy to adversely affect the financial status of targets was to inform businesses and persons with whom subjects had economic dealings of their "questionable" politics. On September 17, 1968, the FBI headquarters was advised that the Pittsburgh field office had succeeded in blocking the awarding of a \$150,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation to

²⁷See Appendix, Airtel on 2/11/71 from SAC in New Orleans; a Teletype dated February 13, 1971 from San Francisco; and a Memorandum on 3/1/71 from SAC in Houston.

²⁸See Appendix, Memorandum dated 2/28/68 from SAC in New York.

a group who was in possession of "several pistols". As a result of this action the organization became defunct.²⁹

Eighthly, the Bureau used the investigative technique of interviews as a covert disruptive tactic during COINTELPRO. Members of targeted groups were openly questioned as the FBI let them know that the Bureau was aware of their activities. These sessions were sometimes used to develop informants out of particular members. A 9/3/69 memorandum from the Los Angeles SAC to the FBI Director boasted that as a result of the interview program the membership in Ron Karenga's United Slaves (US) organization dropped approximately fifty per cent.³⁰

Ninthly, the use of religious and civil leaders and organizations in disruptive activities was not beyond the means employed by the FBI. The ministers, professionals, and small businessmen used here were often quite effective in injuring the recruitment drives of groups ignoring their Bureau inspired pleas to work less disruptively. Martin Luther King, Jr. worked too disruptively as far as the Bureau was concerned. An Airtel dated 3/25/68 from the SAC in Mobile to the FBI Director cites that field office's attempt to dull King's efforts to organize his Washington Spring Project. The ego of a local congregation leader was played upon as the FBI manipulated him to discourage his members from participating in the project.³¹

²⁹See Appendix, Memorandum dated September 17, 1968 from G.C. Moore; and a Memorandum on 9/2/69 from SAC in Jackson.

³⁰See Appendix, Memorandum on 8/30/68 from SAC in Memphis; and a Memorandum on 9/3/69 from SAC in Los Angeles.

³¹See Appendix, Airmail dated 3/25/68 from SAC in Mobile.

Tenthly, the Bureau also released FBI file information in order to influence the results of political or judicial processes in which targets were involved. One such example of this practice was directed at a

student who was a leader of the Afro-American Action Committee who had been arrested in a demonstration at a university. The bureau sent an anonymous letter to the county prosecutor intended to discredit her by exposing her 'subversive connections'; her adoptive father was described as a Communist Party member. The Bureau believed that the letter might aid the prosecutor in his case against the student³²

Eleventhly, informing the subjects' families or others of targets' radical or immoral activity was also done by the FBI under COINTELPRO. Evidence of this practice can be seen in a memorandum filed in Washington by the Cleveland field office. This memorandum requested permission to make "anonymous calls to the subject's wife alleging infidelity with his traveling companions and/or co-workers".³³ This particular type of tactic was labeled as being "abhorrent in a free society" by Senators during investigatory hearings into the intelligence practices of various government agencies.³⁴

Twelvethly, this final category includes various miscellaneous items some of which are clearly illegal. Surreptitious entries, forgery of a group leader's signature stamp, and printing a group's business card for fraudulent purposes are examples

³²U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p. 58.

³³Ibid., p. 55.

³⁴See Appendix, Airtel dated 2/17/71 from the SAC in San Francisco.

of counterintelligence measures falling under this category.³⁵

The FBI's primary consideration in developing its domestic intelligence program against black political activists seems to have been how expeditiously the tactics realized the stated goals of the program. The propriety of the methods was seldom, if ever, questioned.

The lack of propriety can be further illustrated not only by the nature of the tactics used in COINTELPRO-Black Extremists but also by the wide variation in the types of groups and individuals targeted by the program. Even though the Bureau initially stipulated that counterintelligence measures were to focus on subversive, violence-prone organizations, investigations were extended to include subjects whose subversive influence or potential for violence was at most minimal.

A reason for this lack of investigative discrimination stems from applying broad and imprecise labels to entities during the program. The following labels appear in Bureau documents as subjects for COINTELPRO-Black Extremists: "persons with 'anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs' or who were 'espousing the line' of revolutionary movements"; general racial matters; hate organizations; rabble rousers; key activists; black nationalists; agitators; and key black extremists.³⁶ These criteria are clearly political rather than criminal areas stipulated for Bureau investigations.

³⁵U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans Book II, final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress, 2nd session, p. 166.

³⁶Ibid., p. 181.

Further, the specific groups and individuals investigated under one or more of the above labels exemplifies the political, noncriminal basis for FBI intelligence investigations. Among the groups subjected to counterintelligence measures were the Nation of Islam, the Southern Cristian Leadership Conference, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Congress of Racial Equality, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Black Panther Party, the Republic of New Africa, the Revolutionary Action Movement, and Black Student Unions throughout the entire country. This small sampling from the list of investigated organizations adequately indicates the sweeping nature of FBI counterintelligence. A Senate report cites unproven innocence as reason enough for FBI intelligence investigations.³⁷

This same reasoning holds true for individuals being scrutinized by the Bureau. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, was investigated on the basis that he might have been a Communist sympathizer. FBI headquarters repeatedly ignored field offices' reports that he had no Communist ties. It was insisted that until substantial evidence was found that indicated King was anti-Communist, he was to be considered "guilty until proven innocent".³⁸

George C. Moore, the FBI Intelligence Division Supervisor of Black Nationalist Affairs, said that individuals and organizations were targeted because of their propensity for violence; their radical or revolutionary rhetoric and actions; and their

³⁷Ibid., pp. 181, 182.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 20, 21.

infiltration by Communists. Moore explained further before Congressional investigators that the "potential" of dissident activity was enough to justify Bureau investigations.³⁹ Such investigations amounted to sustained governmental monitoring of political activity in the absence of any indication of criminal conduct.

The FBI's standards for investigation in the late 1960s and early 1970s represents a complete reversal of standards stated by Attorney General Stone in 1924. He stated that "The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals."

During COINTELPRO-Black Extremists the FBI operated to control the ideas and associations of individuals and groups that it determined to be a threat to the domestic tranquility. As a result, intelligence practices flagrantly violated the rights guaranteed by the very document the Bureau claimed to protect and uphold.

³⁹Ibid., p. 166.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUDING ASSESSMENTS OF COINTELPRO

The character of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists as portrayed by its historical antecedents, policies' objectives and tactics qualifies it as being political in nature. The FBI did not use the program as an apolitical tool of law enforcement. The Bureau was not concerned with adhering to the parameters set by the Stone Standard. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the FBI was not only concerned with but also sought to repress the opinions and lawful conduct, political or otherwise, of individuals and groups.

This repressive tendency of the Bureau did not appear suddenly out of the clear, blue sky. The presence of domestic counterintelligence developed from the Bureau's traditional treatment of political dissidents. The policies during the post-World War I Red Scare and Palmer Raids are illustrative of later government behavior during the Cold War and McCarthy era. FBI pressure on the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and other leftist organizations acted as precedent for their operations to counter black activism in the 1960s and early 1970s.

It can be clearly seen that the policies stated at the outset of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists do not seek to merely apprehend federal law breakers. The program's objectives were to

disrupt, neutralize, harass, and discredit targeted individuals and groups regardless of their noncriminal opinions and activities. These objectives were accompanied with the longrange goals of destroying the targeted dissidents' recruitment and fundraising capabilities. The extralegal nature of these policies resulted partly from a lack of either a clear legislative mandate or definitive executive directive.

Another indication of the political nature of the Bureau's COINTELPRO-Black Extremists program appears after examining the type of tactics used to achieve its objectives. The legality and propriety of these tactics meant little. The only parameters observed were the avoidance of public embarrassment to the Bureau and the specific tactics' degree of effectiveness.

The United States Congress' investigation into the details of the FBI's domestic intelligence activities resulted in various findings and recommendations that are meant to prevent future abuses. The Senate's findings and recommendations can be found in the final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. This report accurately represents the entire Congress' response to COINTELPRO. Their reaction must be understood if an accurate assessment of domestic counterintelligence is sought.

The summary findings of the Senate's Select Committee place the government's entire intelligence community in a bad light. The committee offered seven major findings revealed by its investigation along with thirty-four subfindings which detail COINTELPRO and its counterparts which operated in other govern-

mental agencies. The major findings are that: (1) agencies' programs often violated and ignored the law; (2) the domestic intelligence activities were excessively overbroad; (3) there was excessive use of intrusive techniques; (4) covert action was used to disrupt and discredit domestic groups; (5) there were political abuses of intelligence information; (6) there were inadequate controls on the dissemination and retention of information; (7) deficiencies in administrative controls and accountability existed.¹

The research done in this study, to a large extent, substantiates these findings and various subfindings. They seem to be valid and comprehensive. However, it must be pointed out that full access to the files of the various security agencies, including the FBI, was never gained by Congressional or Executive investigators. Furthermore, when sensitive material was released it was frequently censored by Bureau officials. Yet, these censored, incomplete files were adequate enough for conclusions and recommendations that were to be offered.

The conclusions offered by the Senate is critical of the FBI's intelligence operations. It is stated that, "The Committee's fundamental conclusion is that intelligence activities have undermined the constitutional rights of citizens..." This conclusion also holds that wrongs have occurred because the

¹U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans Book II, the final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Congress, 2nd session, p. 137. Also to be found in this report are the various subfindings of the committee.

the "checks and balances designed by the framers of the Constitution to assure accountability have not been applied."²

The recommendations following this conclusion are based on the belief that the extralegal activities of the FBI's domestic intelligence program were an aberration of the system. The Congress maintains that the constitutional system adequately allows for the protection of the freedoms of speech, association, and privacy which were often violated by domestic counterintelligence. The recommendations offered follow this reasoning, in that the controls suggested are meant to place intelligence activities in a more acceptable context.

Broadly stated, these recommendations are: (1) intelligence agencies are subject to the rule of law; (2) the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and military service and Defense Department investigative agencies should be precluded from domestic security activities; (3) non-intelligence agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Postal Service should be barred from domestic security activities; (4) federal domestic security activities should be limited and controlled to prevent abuse without hampering criminal investigations or investigations of foreign espionage; (5) the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General for oversight of domestic intelligence operations must be clarified and strengthened; (6) administrative rulemaking and increased disclosure should be required; (7) civil remedies should be expanded; (8) criminal penalties should be expanded; (9) vague anti-sedition

²Ibid., p. 289.

laws, such as the Smith Act, should be either amended or repealed; (10) broadened access to intelligence agency files should be provided to the General Accounting Office since it is the investigative arm of Congress; and (11) Congressional oversight should be intensified.³

A critical view of the Congress' position on domestic intelligence should consider the basic assumptions upon which these conclusion and reommendations are based. The Senate investigative committee assumes that the government's power to conduct domestic intelligence activities is a necessary and proper role. Operations that are designed to insure "domestic tranquility" and that "provide for the common defense" are acceptable.⁴

A second assumption is that the government will exercise its power to conduct domestic intelligence activities to the fullest extent in times of crisis. The 1960s and early 1970s saw a near complete realization of just how far the government would clandestinely go to preserve the status quo. The Congress sees its only duty here as drawing the line between legal dissent and criminal conduct which can become subject to intelligence operations.⁵

Other assumptions held by this investigative body are, first, that past excesses allowed by advanced technological capability can be controlled by statutory restraints; and, second,

³Ibid., pp. 296-339.

⁴Ibid., p. 289.

⁵Ibid. The basic assumptions of the Committee are stated on pp. 289-290.

that despite failures for five decades of officials to obey the law, abusive, domestic intelligence practices can be avoided by administrative controls.

All of these assumptions guided the committee's judgment as recommendations were formed to meet the critical findings of their investigation. However, a closer examination of the investigatory report need not focus on its specific findings. Because the scope of this study is not broad enough and because of a lack of resources to validate each finding the factual materials will not be questioned. Much of the remaining focus will therefore be upon the basic assumptions underlying the recommendations.

Firstly, the assumption that the government's power to conduct domestic intelligence remains unquestioned must be examined. This power is said to be necessary for the maintenance of domestic tranquility. Whose tranquility are the committee investigators speaking of? Obviously, the preservation of the status quo is of primary importance as intelligence programs operate. It would therefore appear that any organized, politically dissident behavior would be defined as threatening the nation's internal peace. Such activities would qualify as ter-gets for intelligence operations. Despite the Congress' public outcries that the civil liberties of all citizens must be protected they affirm that noncriminal, politically dissident activities must be subject to governmental approval. Historically, such approval has not been gained by groups critical of the status quo. This report does not alter that tradition. The

recommendations that are offered are only suggested restraints to protect groups and individuals deemed politically safe from intelligence excesses.

The second assumption, that the government will exercise its power to conduct domestic intelligence activities to the fullest extent in times of crisis, must also be examined. Again, it can be seen here that despite the Congress' call for "fundamental reform", the government's role as protectors of the status quo does not change. This assumption only substantiates the Bureau's claim to use any means necessary in quelling disturbances of the domestic tranquility. When such means will be used is not precisely stated. Nor is it specified who will determine such a time. In light of history, this point becomes paramount. For example, a time of crisis as defined by President Richard Nixon was the Watergate scandal while President Lyndon Johnson defined it as the era of anti-war protests. Traditionally, times of crisis have been defined in personal terms by executive officials as vast governmental resources were directed against groups and individuals advocating noncriminal, dissident positions.

Another assumption which must be briefly focused upon is that the advanced technological capability that has resulted in many past intelligence abuses can be controlled by statutory restraints. Because the role of electronic surveillance is a study that is too broad for the scope of this paper only one point will be made here. History has shown that technological advances are often made beyond the pace assumed by legislative

controls. Laws passed by Congress to control various devices and to protect the rights of citizens are either obsolete in a short time or are so vague until their purposes are often circumvented.

The last assumption examined here is that the past excesses of intelligence activities can be prevented in the future by statutory restraints and administrative controls. Of all the assumptions, this one is probably the most fanciful. This position denies two factors. Firstly, the enforcement of statutory restraints upon federal law enforcement agencies requires that someone associated with those agencies knows and is willing to reveal violations while also expecting them to have the means with which to enforce statutes that have been violated. These conditions have rarely, if ever, existed.

Secondly, the effectiveness of administrative controls over federal law enforcement agencies has seldom been enough to prevent abuse. The committee's assumption ignores the role administrative officials played in past intelligence activities. Not only have officials formulated policies within intelligence agencies that routinely violated citizens' rights but they also hid those programs' objectives and tactics from government and civilian personnel not allied with their cause. To expect these same officials to reverse their course and in doing so incriminate themselves and their colleagues is not rational.

The historical evidence denies the committee's assumptions, particularly the last one. For instance, an examination of FBI domestic intelligence programs illustrates that the Bureau's

Director repeatedly avoided obeying the policies of his superior, the Attorney General. A typical example of this is found in Chapter II of this study where the orders of Attorney General Biddle were circumvented by the Director.

In summary, anticipating agencies conducting domestic intelligence to avoid abusive use of their resources is not reasonable. Statutory restraints, administrative controls, and other reformatory measures are not designed to eliminate the reoccurrence of another COINTELPRO-Black Extremists. At best the domestic intelligence community can only be expected to be more careful about being publicly embarrassed.

The Senate's report performs one vital function regardless of its flaws. Its findings, conclusion, and recommendations serve to quiet the critics of the intelligence community's past domestic abuses. The condemnations it offers regarding past abuses and the parameters it suggest be set on future domestic intelligence activities appear to verify the vitality of the system of checks and balances.

However, upon a closer look, the report fails to recommend the elimination of political policing by federal agencies, the statutory restraints suggested to prevent future abuses were never made into law, and the administrative controls proposed to curb intradepartmental intelligence abuses ignore the historical roles of various officials as domestic political dissidents became targets for counterintelligence. The policy and tactics of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists exemplify the nature of counterintelligence in the United States.

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APPENDIX

Memorandum

W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 29, 1968

G. C. Moore *ACV/177*

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

PURPOSE:

To expand the Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalist groups from 23 to 41 field divisions so as to cover the great majority of black nationalist activity in this country.

BACKGROUND:

By letter dated August 25, 1967, 23 field offices were advised of a new Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalists and prevent violence on their part. Goals of this program are to prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups, prevent the rise of a leader who might unify and electrify these violence-prone elements, prevent these militants from gaining respectability and prevent the growth of these groups among America's youth.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

In view of the tremendous increase in black nationalist activity, and the approach of summer, this program should be expanded and these goals should be reiterated to the field. Attached airtel also instructs the field to submit periodic progress letters to stimulate thinking in this area.

Attached airtel also reminds the field that counterintelligence suggestions to expose these militants or neutralize them must be approved by the Bureau.

ACTION:

6 MAR 11 1968

That attached airtel expanding this program, defining goals and instructing periodic progress letters be submitted be sent Albany and the other listed field offices.

Enclosure *sent 3/4-68*

TJD:rmm (6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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OTHERWISE.

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Mr. Sullivan
Mr. DeLoach

5-780

Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

BACKGROUND

By letter dated 8/25/67 the following offices were advised of the beginning of a Counterintelligence Program against militant Black Nationalist-Hate Groups:

Albany
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Charlotte
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Jackson
Los Angeles

Memphis
Newark
New Orleans
New York
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Richmond
St. Louis
San Francisco
Washington Field

Each of the above offices was to designate a Special Agent to coordinate this program. Replies to this letter indicated an interest in counterintelligence against militant black nationalist groups that foment violence and several offices outlined procedures which had been effective in the past. For example, Washington Field Office had furnished information about a new Nation of Islam (NOI) grade school to appropriate authorities in the District of Columbia who investigated to determine if the school conformed to District regulations for private schools. In the process WFO obtained background information on the parents of each pupil.

The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a pro-Chinese communist group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer of 1967. The Philadelphia Office alerted local police, who then put RAM leaders under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent most of the summer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place.

The Counterintelligence Program is now being expanded to include 41 offices. Each of the offices added to this program should designate an Agent familiar with black

Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

nationalist activity, and interested in counterintelligence, to coordinate this program. This Agent will be responsible for the periodic progress letters being requested, but each Agent working this type of case should participate in the formulation of counterintelligence operations.

GOALS

For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence Program, and to prevent wasted effort, long-range goals are being set.

1. Prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups. In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real "Hau Hau" in America, the beginning of a true black revolution.
2. Prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement. Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah;" he is the martyr of the movement today. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammed all aspire to this position. Elijah Muhammed is less of a threat because of his age. King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism. Carmichael has the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this way.
3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups. This is of primary importance, and is, of course, a goal of our investigative activity; it should also be a goal of the Counterintelligence Program. Through counterintelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence.
4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community. The goal of discrediting black nationalists must be handled tactically in three ways. You must discredit these groups and individuals to, first, the responsible Negro community. Second, they must be discredited to the white community.

Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

both the responsible community and to "liberals" who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist simply because they are Negroes. Third, these groups must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals, the followers of the movement. This last area requires entirely different tactics from the first two. Publicity about violent tendencies and radical statements merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds "respectability" in a different way.

5. A final goal should be to prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these groups from converting young people must be developed.

Besides these five goals counterintelligence is a valuable part of our regular investigative program as it often produces positive information.

TARGETS

Primary targets of the Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, should be the most violent and radical groups and their leaders. We should emphasize those leaders and organizations that are nationwide in scope and are most capable of disrupting this country. These targets should include the radical and violence-prone leaders, members, and followers of the:

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM),
Nation of Islam (NOI)

Offices handling these cases and those of Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, H. Rap Brown of SNCC, Martin Luther King of SCLC, Maxwell Stanford of RAM, and Elijah Muhammed of NOI, should be alert for counterintelligence suggestions.

INSTRUCTIONS

Within 30 days of the date of this letter each office should:

1. Advise the Bureau of the identity of the Special Agent assigned to coordinate this program.

Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

2. Submit a very succinct summary of the black nationalist movement in the field office territory. Include name, number of members and degree of activity of each black nationalist group. Also state your estimate of each group's propensity for violence. This is for target evaluation only, not for record purposes. Second, list Rabble-Rouser Index subjects who are militant black nationalists and any other militant black nationalist leaders who might be future targets of counterintelligence action because of their propensity for violence. Include a minimum of background information on each person listed; a few descriptive sentences should suffice.

3. List those organizations and individuals you consider of such potential danger as to be considered for current counterintelligence action. Briefly justify each target.

4. Submit any suggestion you have for overall counterintelligence action or the administration of this program. Suggestions for action against any specific target should be submitted by separate letter.

5. Submit, by separate letter, suggestions for counterintelligence action against the targets previously listed as field-wide. These should not be general, such as "publicize Stokely Carmichael's travel to communist countries," but should be specific as to target, what is to be done, what contacts are to be used, and all other information needed for the Bureau to approve a counterintelligence operation.

Thereafter, on a ninety-day-basis, each office is to submit a progress letter summarizing counterintelligence operations proposed during the period, operations effected, and tangible results. Any changes in the overall black nationalist movement should be summarized in this letter. This should include new organizations, new leaders, and any changes in data listed under number two above. Suggestions for counterintelligence operations should not be set out in this progress letter. Use the following captions:

1. Operations Under Consideration, 2. Operations Being Effected, 3. Tangible Results, and 4. Developments of Counterintelligence Interest. These 90-day progress letters are due at the Bureau the first day of March, June, September, and December, excepting March, 1968.

Letter to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

against the Communist Party and related organizations, or the program entitled "Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security, Disruption of Hate Groups," (Bufile 157-9), which is directed against Klan and hate-type groups primarily consisting of white memberships.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and their memberships should be alerted to our counterintelligence interest and each investigative Agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program. You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations and techniques considered under the program.

No counterintelligence action under this program may be initiated by the field without specific prior Bureau authorization.

You are urged to take an enthusiastic and imaginative approach to this new counterintelligence endeavor and the Bureau will be pleased to entertain any suggestions or techniques you may recommend.

Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

The effectiveness of counterintelligence depends on the quality and quantity of positive information available regarding the target and on the imagination and initiative of Agents working the program. The response of the field to the Counterintelligence Program against the Communist Party, USA, indicates that a superb job can be done by the field on counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence operations must be approved by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each operation must be designed to protect the Bureau's interest so that there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau. Beyond this the Bureau will give every possible consideration to your proposals.

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned as above dated 2/29/68, prepared by TJD:rmm.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 4/1/68

SAC, NEW YORK (100-161140) (P)

TO:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

It is suggested that the following letter be sent to H. RAP BROWN as soon as he gets out of jail.

Dear RAP:

Dig this man. I got it from inside. STOKELY and FORMAN sent you to the West Coast so that the man would get you. They are a little too cool for you RAP Baby. With you out of the way they can have the whole pie.

SOUL BROTHER

The above letter designed to plant seeds of distrust between BROWN, CARMICHAEL, and FORMAN will be typed double spaced on plain white paper.

The typing of the letter and envelope will be handled by the NYO. The letter will be mailed from a mailbox in NYC and sent to BROWN as soon as his address can be determined.

Bureau authority is requested for the NYO to proceed along lines set forth above.

REC 3

2- Bureau (RM)
1- New York

JJD:amb
(1)

10 APR 3 1968

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OTHERWISE.

RACIAL INT. SECT.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 4/4/68

FROM : SAC, JACKSON (100-980) (P)

SUBJECT:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE PROGRAM
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, dated 3/4/68,
and Jackson letter to the Bureau, dated 4/4/68.

In accordance with instructions from Item
#5 of Page 5 in the first reference above, the follow-
ing suggestions are forwarded as possible counterintel-
ligence actions against previously determined field
wide targets:

I. SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE (SCLC)

MARTIN LUTHER KING

A. KING has changed the date of his
Washington Spring Project (WSP) on several occasions;
he has, on occasion, announced his anticipated presence
at various locations, and then send a top aide instead
of appearing himself; he has periodically changed the
dates of his appearances in certain geographic areas.
Many times, announcements were made when KING was to be
at a specific WSP meeting in order to draw a crowd, when
actually it was known in advance by KING that he would
not attend.

2 - Bureau (RM) (AM)
2 - Jackson (100-980)
TF/bjk
(4)

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

50 APR 15 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

It is felt the above considerations can be exploited to cause confusion in the efforts of KING and his group, and to cause Negro dissatisfaction with his operating procedures. This could be accomplished by the following:

- 1) When KING is actually to be at a gathering, have informants circulate false information as to time, date and location of KING's appearance, or variations of each, i.e., correct time and place, but different location, correct location, but different date, et cetera.
- 2) Have informants circulate information that KING is to be at announced local meetings of SCLC groups when, in fact, he will not be present.
- 3) Announce, through informant, when KING is to be at specific place, that this is only a guise to draw a crowd, and only local leaders will be present, excluding KING.

B. KING and his top aides dress expensively, generally travel via first class means, and stay at first class accommodations usually in predominately white areas of cities he visits. Recently, in Memphis, KING ran from his followers when violence erupted during a march he was leading there. It is felt the above two considerations could be linked to discredit KING and his aides with poor Negroes who he is seeking support from. This could be accomplished by the preparation of a flyer showing photographs of KING and aides dressed well, next to photographs of Negroes poorly clothed; under the photograph would be data concerning his expensive tastes, accommodations, use of private airplane, and related data; with this information would be information concerning

KING's deserting his followers during the Memphis riots. The key note message would be that KING and his aides are out for their own financial and physical welfare primarily. Flyers could be prepared from newspaper photographs of KING and his aides, or from some photographs available at various field offices. Distribution could be by anonymous mailings to poor Negro leaders, or by placement of copies at Negro meeting places by informants.

II. STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

This group has discouraged its members from associating with whites. Information has been developed that some leaders and top functionaries, since the establishment of this policy, have periodically maintained close associations, to include residing with white girl friends. Information concerning these associations could be capitalized on by counterintelligence measures to show the hypocrisy of these leaders and to discredit the individuals involved with their new "Black only" oriented associates in the same organization, and to discredit them with leaders of other Black Nationalist organizations with whom they may be seeking support or rapport.

Specifically, efforts could be undertaken to obtain photographs of the principals involved with their white girl friends. The flyer could then be prepared containing this photograph or photographs. Under the photograph could be information regarding the principals' position with SNCC, followed by quotations of top SNCC leaders regarding associations with whites or Black Separatists statements. The flyers could be mailed anonymously to pertinent National and local leaders of SNCC and/or to leaders of other Black Nationalist organizations advocating Black separatism, rather than simply

mailing letters anonymously, these letters could be sent under the guise of Nation of Islam, Revolutionary Action Movement, or other similar groups who could be construed to be criticizing as a group the individuals' activity as a representative of SNCC.

FBI

Date: 2/10/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)
 FROM: SAC, NEWARK (100-49654)
 SUBJECT: COINTELPRO-BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) - DISSENSION
 RACIAL MATTERS
 BUDED: 2/10/71

Re Bureau airtel 2/2/71 to SAC, Albany.

The following proposal is aimed at local
 dissension:

Because of the fact that the local BPP units are without leadership, finances or any viable programs, it is considered that any counterintelligence measure directed at causing dissension within the local branches would be ineffective at this time; but rather a measure directed from outside forces would be more fruitful.

Informants have continued to report that there has been a growing hostility between [redacted] and the BLACK PANTHER PARTY. BPP members from Jersey City are known to come to Newark to sell the BLACK PANTHER PARTY newspaper in the downtown area, as well as the ghetto areas.

It is recommended that the following letter be sent to the BPP at 93 Summit Ave., Jersey City, NJ:

"We have warned you before that this is our town and that you and your paper should stay in Jersey City. We took care of [redacted] without any bloodshed. Maybe you will not be so fortunate if you continue to sell your paper in this city".

2-Bureau (REC-52/100-448006-2246)
 3-Newark
 (1-100-49194)
 (1-S-3 Desk)

GEJ:jz
 (5)

EX-111
 FEB 12 1971

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Per _____

FBI

Date: 2/1/68

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

A I R T E L

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, BOSTON (157-531)
SUBJECT: COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS
INTERNAL SECURITY

Re Bulet to Albany, 8/25/67.

In connection with captioned program, the Boston Division is submitting the following suggestion:

Boston SNCC has been promoting the idea of forming a United Front in Boston made up of representatives of all Negro organizations in the Greater Boston area. This United Front in turn would elect representatives to form a National United Front with representatives from other cities. Through this means, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee claims black power would be concentrated into its greatest strength.

STOKELY CARMICHAEL visited Boston on 1/25/68 to address a meeting of representatives of Negro organizations which had met to consider the United Front idea. The idea has met with opposition generally because of the fact that CARMICHAEL's name is associated with it. To counteract this, SNCC will attempt to have the idea supported in the Boston area by organizations known to be more moderate, such as National Association for Advancement of Colored People, Urban League, and Exodus. The Bureau has been advised of the above by separate communication.

③ - Bureau (RM)
1 - Boston

JFN:12

(4)

E. C. Bishop

REC 16

12
FEB 7 1968

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OTHERWISE

SECT.

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

M

Per _____

It is suggested that efforts being made by CARMICHAEL to form a United Front be exposed in a news article which would also include the facts that CARMICHAEL has traveled in and out of Boston using assumed names and evasive tactics in a typical criminal type of activity. The fact that CARMICHAEL has held secret meetings in Boston to set up plans for some activity in Boston during the summer of 1968 would also be brought out.

If approved, it is proposed to present the idea to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and would completely protect the Bureau's interest. He has, in the past, indicated a willingness to assist the Bureau in any way in a proposal of this type and to accept complete responsibility for it.

In the past the Globe has given strong support to negro complaints against discrimination, segregation, and poor housing. This newspaper also was a vigorous supporter of the negro complaint of "de facto" segregation in the Boston Public School System. For this reason it is read by a much larger percentage of negroes in the Roxbury area than any other Boston paper. Although the Globe has in the past published some articles which have been anti-Bureau in tone, this paper has always been cooperative with the Boston Office. It is believed the type of article suggested would get the most exposure and be read by the greater majority of negroes in the Metropolitan Boston area if it appears in the Globe. There is no question but what the Bureau's interests will be safeguarded.

It is also suggested that certain portions of Bureau airtel to Albany dated 1/19/68 entitled, "Foreign Influences in the Black Nationalist Movement" (racial intelligence section) concerning foreign travel of STOKELY CARMICHAEL be released for inclusion in the proposed article. Further that the current [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is believed exposure of such facts would inform all responsible groups of the extent of CARMICHAEL's travel and contacts and would tend to alienate them from SNCC activities. It is believed it would also be a deterrent for any activity which militant groups may have planned for Boston for the summer of 1968.

The Bureau might also wish to consider a release of a similar type on a national level through Bureau sources.

Since a third organizational meeting of the United Front is to be held soon on an as yet unscheduled date, it is requested that the Bureau give consideration to this proposal as soon as possible. It is believed that the sooner such an article could be released, the better effect it would have, since at this time, representatives of certain organizations in Boston are sitting on the fence with respect to joining the United Front.

In the event of Bureau approval, the Bureau's interest will be completely protected.

FBI

Date: 3/18/68

Transmit the following in _____

AIRTEL

(Type in plaintext or code)
AIRMAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7182)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

D. J. [Signature]

Re Bureau airtel to Atlanta 3/14/68.

Baltimore's suggestion of utilizing a cartoon to depict the apparent alliance between SCLC and the NOI has, as the Bureau noted, definite merit. However, Atlanta is of the opinion the Bureau's suggestion of a pertinent newspaper article is more appropriate under the circumstances and might lend itself to wider circulation than a cartoon. The impact on KING of printed matter is apt to be greater than material presented in a cartoon no matter how skillfully it may be presented.

On 2/23/66 KING met with ELIJAH MUHAMMAD in the latter's residence in Chicago for the purpose of enlisting MUHAMMAD's aid in fighting Chicago slum conditions. Atlanta's highly confidential sources at that time never developed any pertinent information describing KING's reaction to or evaluation of this meeting. Chicago sources reported the meeting was not successful in developing any mutuality or cooperation mainly because of religious and philosophical differences between KING and MUHAMMAD.

It is noted that during an SCLC retreat held in Atlanta in the middle of January 1968 regarding the WSP KING stressed that obtaining jobs or income for Negroes would represent a mere fraction of that which America owes

(3- Bureau (RM)

1- Baltimore (157-2520) (RM)
1- Chicago (RM)

2- Atlanta (100-7182)
(1 - 157-2924) 1968

EX-116

Sent AGS:jhs M Per (7)

Approved: [Signature] Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/01 BY [Signature]

100-211201-40
FBI

AT-100-7182


the Negro throughout its history. He declared America owes an incalculable sum to the Negro who throughout his long years of involuntary servitude labored to build this country. This language almost suggests some degree of adherence to teachings of ELIJAH MUHAMMAD.

It is suggested the proposed publicity might be slanted to convey the thought that the apparent alliance between SCLC and the NOI possibly grew out of the former meeting between KING and MUHAMMAD; that in connection with the WSP SCLC is "pushing" the NOI in Baltimore. This, of course, would raise a question as to the sincerity of KING's current statements that the WSP is to be based on nonviolent techniques because the position of the NOI toward the white man is basically one of annihilation.

While KING is currently seeking the cooperation of other organizations to assist with SCLC's WSP he has shown no willingness to use SCLC to assist any other organization.

In effort to finance the WSP, SCLC plans to seek financial contributions from Negro churches. Establishing the thought of an alliance with the NOI which is opposed to Christianity may well discourage a favorable reaction on the part of some Negro churches.

It is felt KING's reaction to the proposed technique would be positive for counterintelligence purposes. KING considers himself a devotee of the nonviolent philosophies of the late MAHATMA GANDHI. To publicly align him and/or SCLC with the NOI should trouble him on this basis. It is further conceivable that MUHAMMAD may see fit to respond to this publicly which should embarrass KING further.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: February 26, 1971

SAC, NEW HAVEN (157-785) P

CT: COINTELPRO - BLACK EXTREMISTS
RACIAL MATTERS

Re: New Haven letters to Bureau, 12/1/70 and 2/4/71;
New Haven teletype, 2/3/71, entitled "BLACK PANTHER PARTY, PUBLIC
APPEARANCES, RM - BPP, COINTELPRO;" Bureau airtel to Albany,
Et Al, 2/2/71, entitled "COINTELPRO - BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) -
DISSENSION, RACIAL MATTERS;" and Bureau airtel to New Haven,
2/17/71.

The following is a 90-day summary of Counterintelligence
Program activities within the New Haven Division:

I. OPERATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION

New Haven is presently preparing to submit the following
proposals:

A. A letter to the editor of the "New Haven Register"
mildly chiding them for publication of a recent article concerning
the fact that HUEY P. NEWTON lives in a plush \$650 per month
apartment in Oakland, California. The article was an "AP"
release but was published in conjunction with a second article
concerning the fact that 28 Panthers had not been killed by
police but, in fact, only the case of WILLIAM HAMPTON has turned
out to be a bona fide police-Panther action. Both these articles
caused embarrassment to the Panthers locally in New Haven.

B. The Black Panther Party in New Haven is attempting
to obtain a new headquarters at 259 Dixwell Avenue. The reason
the Panthers must vacate the present headquarters at 35 Sylvan
Avenue is the fact that they have completely destroyed this
residence and it is uninhabitable. The plumbing, electrical
and heating systems are in extremely bad shape.

Counterintelligence measures are under consideration
in order to attempt to foil the efforts of the BPP in securing
new headquarters.

ST. 104

REC-47

100-448006-214

2 - Bureau
2 - New Haven

IMG:lmg

(4)

REGISTERED MAIL

2 MAR 4 1971

INT. SECT.

0 0 3 ✓

NH 157-785

II. OPERATIONS BEING EFFECTED

The anonymous letter to Cleveland ^{over} in which the Bureau authorized on 2/17/71 has been sent.

III. TANGIBLE RESULTS

During the month of January, numerous black businesses were visited by Bureau Agents, New Haven. Copies of the Counterintelligence documents entitled "Ten Point Program" and "Like It Is" were observed in many of these firms.

New Haven proposed a Counterintelligence measure in connection with the proposed television appearance of HUEY NEWTON but this appearance was cancelled at the last moment.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERESTS

There is a great deal of strife and internal bickering in the New Haven BPP. The New Haven Office will make every effort to exploit this strife through the Counterintelligence Program.

Memorandum

50

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 3/28/68

FROM : SAC, NEW ORLEANS (105-3138) (P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

ReBuairtel to Albany, 3/4/68.

The following specific suggestion under captioned program is being submitted for the Bureau's consideration in regard to SNCC:

This suggestion is being submitted by New Orleans and, if implemented, it is believed it would tend to cast suspicion on SNCC and its leaders among the Negro population throughout the US.

As the Bureau is aware, RAP BROWN has been incarcerated in the Orleans Parish Jail, at New Orleans, La., since 2/21/68. A review of information received from New Orleans sources and information received by New Orleans from other field offices, reveals that SNCC has been attempting to raise the \$30,000.00 bond money for BROWN among the Negro communities in these areas.

As a disruptive tactic, it would appear that the Bureau might desire to contact a trusted source in one of the national wire services such as AP or UPI and have this individual write an article for national distribution to the effect that SNCC and its leaders have been soliciting funds in various areas of the country to raise the \$30,000.00 bond money for BROWN. This article could allege that contributions were collected which exceeded the \$30,000.00 needed. However, when a final accounting was made, only approximately \$10,000.00 was turned in. As a result, SNCC leaders and members are accusing each other of stealing the money collected.

(2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - New Orleans

SNC:mhc
(4)

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OTHERWISE.

REC 13

4 APR 1 1968

NO 105-3138

It would appear that, if this news article were properly prepared, it would have a damaging effect on SNCC and place SNCC in a bad light among the Negro community.

Future counterintelligence measures which might benefit New Orleans will be submitted at a later date.

1 - D. DeLoach
1 - C. Sullivan
1 - E. Bishop
1 - G.C. Moore

SAC, Albany

8/5/68

Director, FBI (100-448006)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

The Bureau wants to bring a highly successful counterintelligence operation to the attention of all counterintelligence offices, so that all offices will be aware of the type of results that can be obtained in this program.

The Miami Division developed a source at a local television station and the source produced a news special on black nationalists and on the New Left. Miami requested Bureau authority to furnish the source background data of a public source nature when the source indicated an interest in producing a show exposing these groups.

2 - Atlanta
2 - Baltimore
2 - Birmingham
2 - Boston
2 - Buffalo
2 - Charlotte
2 - Chicago
2 - Cincinnati
2 - Columbia
2 - Cleveland
2 - Denver
2 - Detroit
2 - Houston
2 - Indianapolis
2 - Jackson
2 - Jacksonville
2 - Kansas City
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Memphis
2 - Miami
2 - Milwaukee

2 - Minneapolis
2 - Mobile
2 - Newark
2 - New Haven
2 - New Orleans
2 - New York
2 - Omaha
2 - Philadelphia
2 - Phoenix
2 - Pittsburgh
2 - Portland
2 - Richmond
2 - Sacramento
2 - San Diego
2 - San Francisco
2 - Seattle
2 - Springfield
2 - St. Louis
2 - Tampa
2 - WFO

EX-102

REC-34

AUG 14 1968

100-448006-2

(91)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 3

SENT DIRECTOR
FOR APPROVAL
8-5-68

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Letter to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
100-448006

SHOW APPEARED 7/7/68

The Bureau authorized [redacted] furnishing the source data on a confidential basis and the [redacted]. A great deal of research was done by Miami Agents and it resulted in an excellent program. The show, which ended with quotes from the Director on the nature of the New Left, was so well received that the television station received requests for a film of the show by local civic groups.

As you are aware publicity about New Left and black nationalist groups, especially television coverage, sometimes enhances the stature of these groups. At the same time, Miami has demonstrated that a carefully planned television show can be extremely effective in showing these extremists for what they are. Local New Left and black nationalist leaders were interviewed on the show and seemed to have been chosen for either their inability to articulate or their simpering and stupid appearance.

Miami furnished a film of this show for Bureau review and it was apparent that the television source used the very best judgment in editing comments by these extremists. He brought out that they were in favor of violent revolution without their explaining why. But he also brought out that they, personally, would be afraid to lead a violent revolution, making them appear to be cowards. The interview of black nationalist leaders on the show had the leaders seated, ill at ease, in hard chairs. Full-length camera shots showed each movement as they squirmed about in their chairs, resembling rats trapped under scientific observation.

Each counterintelligence office should be alert to exploit this technique both for black nationalists and New Left types. Miami learned from sources that those who appeared on the show realized that it presented them in a most unfavorable light. One even complained to the television station about it. This counterintelligence operation will be of great value in the South Florida area

Retyped page of letter to SAC, Albany
dated 8/5/68 RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

Letter to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
100-448006

and the Bureau hopes these results can be duplicated in other offices. Success in this case resulted from hard work and acumen on the part of the Agents who handled the matter. Especially important was the choice of individuals interviewed as they did not have the ability to stand up to a professional newsman. The fine job of interviewing and editing done by the news people involved was also most important.

Each office should be alert to the possibility of using this technique. No counterintelligence action should be taken without Bureau authority. For your information operations of this type must be handled through reliable, established sources and must be set up so that the FBI is not revealed as the source.

NOTE:

See memorandum G.C. Moore to Mr. W.C. Sullivan, captioned as above, dated 8/1/68, prepared by [REDACTED]

Memorandum

DATE: April 5, 1968

TO: Director, FBI (25-330971)

FROM: SAC, Denver (100-8098)

SUBJECT: NATION OF ISLAM
IS - NOICOUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Re Denver letter to Bureau dated 4/3/68, bearing Counterintelligence Program caption.

Denver does not feel the Nation of Islam (NOI) should be a target for counterintelligence action at this time. There has been no evidence any NOI members joined in the activities of the young people who caused minor racial disturbances in Denver during the summer of 1967. These disturbances were spontaneous and were caused by young Negro people who wanted more recreation facilities for the young Negro population of Denver.

The Denver group of the NOI, with its 20 members, does not have a large enough membership to discredit its leaders by mailing leaflets or letters to the membership.

It cannot be stated as to what reaction would result from harassment of the NOI members, whether it would cause them to lose membership and disband or cause them to become more militant.

If the Bureau, with above facts in mind, feels the Denver NOI group should be a target for counterintelligence action, the following are suggestions:

1. Ask Denver Fire Department to inspect building housing NOI mosque for possible condemnation as fire hazard. If done, this request would be made to [REDACTED] who is personally known to several Agents of the Denver Office.

NOT RECORDED

APR 9 1968

4-12 - Bureau (RM) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
2 - Denver HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
(1 - 157-199) EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE.

55 APR 11 1968

2. Anonymously have telephones of members disconnected.

3. Mail letters to NOI members reflecting they originated from members of the "Minutemen."

4. Have Denver Police Department patrol car officers issue traffic citations to NOI members when they leave NOI mosque as one or two of them make U-turns in front of the mosque when departing. If this were done, [REDACTED] Denver Police Department, an established source, would be used as a contact.

5. Anonymously attempt to have electricity and water shut off in members' residences.

6. Make telephone calls to mosque while meetings are in progress to disrupt meetings.

7. Anonymously furnish information to newspapers regarding leader of Denver group of NOI being a schoolteacher in an all-white school; also, that three other members are employees of U. S. Government. Bureau has previously been advised of the identity of these Government employees.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 2/26/71

FROM : SAC, MEMPHIS (100-4542) (P*)

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO - BLACK EXTREMISTS
RACIAL MATTERS (PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY PARTY -
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM)

Re Memphis letter to Bureau 11/12/70.

90-DAY PROGRESS LETTER

I. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION

By separate letter the Memphis Office has requested Bureau permission to mail to each member and known sympathizer of the Peoples Revolutionary Party - National Committee to Combat Fascism (PRP-NCCF) at Memphis, Tennessee, a copy of an article captioned "Soph Class Examines Recent Panther Rejections," which appeared in Harvard University student newspaper, "The Hilltop."

It is believed that doubt regarding Black Panther Party concepts and aims can be created in the minds of members and sympathizers of the PRP-NCCF by an anonymous mailing of this article to all such members.

II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BEING EFFECTED

A. The Memphis Office continues to furnish information of a restricted nature to trusted liaison sources and newspaper sources of the Memphis Office. Considerable information has been furnished to trusted reporters of local daily newspapers regarding plans and activities of the Black Panther Party oriented PRP-NCCF group at Memphis. Due to the successes of this program, every effort is being made to expand the dissemination on a confidential basis of information which can be used by local daily newspapers to discredit and embarrass the local Black Panther group known as PRP-NCCF.

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Memphis
HSL:wp
(4)

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ME 100-4542 . .

- B. The anonymous mailing to selected newspapers, black organizations, colleges and universities within this division of reprints of an article captioned "Soph Class Examines Recent Panther Rejections," which appeared in the Harvard University student newspaper, "The Hilltop," have been made, but to date no information has been received concerning any positive results of this mailing.

III. TANGIBLE RESULTS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The furnishing of certain information on a confidential basis to trusted local newspaper sources has been most successful. In January, 1971, [redacted]

[redacted] as advised confidentially that the PRP-NCCF at Memphis had received a bundle of Black Panther Party newspapers and had called a meeting of their membership, which included a group of high school students, regarding the selling on the streets of Memphis of this Black Panther Party newspaper. At this meeting it was decided that all members of the PRP-NCCF and the group of high school students who were to help sell this paper would meet at an abandoned church in a Negro ghetto area where the Black Panther Party papers would be distributed to the individuals who were to sell these on the streets.

[redacted] was furnished the location of the meeting place and the time of the meeting, and it was suggested that she be at this church with a news photographer just prior to the appointed time of the meeting. [redacted] complied, and this resulted in an oral fight between members of this PRP-NCCF group. It created suspicion on the part of the membership that there was an informant in the group. As a result of this action, no longer are high school students being asked to help sell Black Panther Party newspapers. In addition, suspicion was cast on one [redacted]

[redacted] as being a police informant inasmuch as he was present at the original meeting but not present at the church where the Black Panther Party papers were distributed. TEN

This counterintelligence program also was successful in disrupting the breakfast program of the PRP-NCCF group. Information regarding the location of the breakfast program and the unsanitary conditions which

E 100-4542

existed in the church where this program was being conducted was furnished to [redacted]. This reporter visited the location of the breakfast program, attempted to interview persons connected with the breakfast program, and then wrote a derogatory article about the program and the unsanitary conditions under which the program operated. As a result, Memphis City health officials condemned the church building and the breakfast program was abandoned.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTEREST

It is still believed by the Memphis Office that the best counterintelligence operation against a black militant organization is the extremely close cooperation between Special Agents of the FBI handling racial matters and Intelligence Units or similar Police Department squads handling racial matters.

During the past three months, information received from racial informants, racial sources, and ghetto informants concerning the identities of automobiles used by black militants, possible criminal activity, and the use of drugs on the part of black militants has been furnished to the Memphis Police Department Intelligence Unit, with the request that the Special Services Squad, a select unit of officers who patrol and handle non-routine police matters, be advised.

The furnishing of this type of information has resulted in the local arrest of [redacted] on drug charges. [redacted] a former member of the black militant group at Memphis known as the Invaders, was recently released from prison after being convicted of the ambush shooting of a Memphis police officer.

[redacted] one of the leaders of the PRP-NCCF in Memphis, was arrested in the first week of February, 1971, charged with hit and run. This information regarding the hit and run was received from a [redacted] and was furnished to the Memphis Police Department, solving this hit and run accident.

Information received from an informant of the Memphis Office was immediately furnished to the Memphis Police Department to the effect that the PRP-NCCF members

ME 100-4542

who had illegally occupied an apartment in a Memphis Housing Authority project were expecting to be raided by the Memphis Police Department in the early morning hours of 1/18/71 and as a result were sandbagging and otherwise barricading windows and doors of this apartment. As a result of the information furnished to the Memphis Police Department, the Memphis Police Department expedited this raid from 3:00 a.m. to around midnight, catching the PRP-NCCF members by surprise, catching them with guns without ammunition and without completing the sandbagging and barricading of this apartment. This in the minds of the Memphis Police Department no doubt prevented bloodshed and enabled the Memphis Police Department to successfully apprehend all subjects.

Information from Memphis informants enabled the Memphis Police Department to locate and apprehend, the day after the above arrests, two additional PRP-NCCF members who were not in the apartment house at the time of the above-mentioned raid.

Information furnished by Memphis informants, which was disseminated to the Memphis Police Department, concerning a Support ANGELA DAVIS Party attended by members of the Young Workers Liberation League (YWLL) and the PRP-NCCF, at which party juveniles were present, enabled the Memphis Police Department to conduct a raid on this party by Vice Squad officers and resulted in the arrest of Memphis subject [redacted] a YWLL leader at Memphis and a leader of the Committee to Free ANGELA DAVIS. In addition the identity of all persons at this Support ANGELA DAVIS Party was obtained. *Memphis of Young Workers Liberation League*

Information regarding the location and times of black militant meetings, parties and demonstrations and the locations at which PRP-NCCF members plan to sell copies of Black Panther Party newspapers and immediately furnished to the Memphis Police Department has resulted in close surveillance by the Memphis Police Department of these meetings, parties, and demonstrations. It has resulted in the identification of people taking part, whose identity was not known to the Memphis Office. As a side benefit, four of the five automobiles used by the PRP-NCCF are no longer being used due to being towed to Police Department

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 13 1971

TELETYPE

NR 019 SP PLAIN

11 58 PM NITEL 2-12-71 MRM

TO DIRECTOR (100-448006)

FROM SAN FRANCISCO (157-601) (P) 1P

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	CD ✓
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalley	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. S. S.	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

COINTELPRO - BLACK EXTREMISTS, RM.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

(BLACK NATIONALIST - HARP GROUP)

RESFTEL FEBRUARY NINE LAST, SETTING FORTH TEXT OF LETTER

TO BE MAILED TO [REDACTED]

LETTER WAS MAILED TO [REDACTED] SPECIAL DELIVERY FROM SANTA CRUZ, CALIFORNIA. LATE EVENING OF FEBRUARY ELEVEN LAST,

[REDACTED] CONTACTED HUEY NEWTON, STATING HE HAD RECEIVED SPECIAL DELIVERY LETTER THAT HUEY SHOULD SEE AND HE BELIEVED IT WAS WRITTEN BY SOMEBODY ON THE INSIDE BECAUSE OF THE SPECIFICS THAT WERE SET FORTH IN THE LETTER. [REDACTED] STATED THE GUY BRINGS IT REAL CLOSE TO HOME, SO CLOSE VERY FEW PEOPLE ARE SUPPOSE TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT. HE BELIEVES HUEY CAN NARROW THE MATTER DOWN AS HE SHOULD KNOW WHO HAS THIS INFORMATION.

HUEY STATES HE IS DEFINITELY OF THE OPINION THERE IS AN INFORMER IN THE PARTY RIGHT IN THE MINISTRY.

END

HOLD

EX-100

REC-45

100-448006 - 2307

1 MAR 1 1971

cc [REDACTED]
20 MAR 20 1971

[REDACTED]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 3/1/71

FROM: SAC, HOUSTON (157-1210) (P)

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO - BLACK EXTREMISTS
RM

ReHOlet, 11/30/70.

I. Operations Under Consideration

No specific counterintelligence operations currently being effected against black nationalist elements in the Houston Division. Peoples Party II (PP II) continues to be the most logical target for counterintelligence activity, in that they are the only activist black militant group currently in operation in Houston even though on a very limited scale at the present time due to lack of finances and members.

and it is anticipated that if their activities lend themselves toward a counterintelligence move,

II. Operations Being Effected

Because of the current status of PP II in that they are financially bankrupt and all their efforts to establish a free health clinic and a free breakfast program have been completely negated, no significant opportunity has developed which would lend itself towards a significant counterintelligence move in this direction.

Bureau (RM)
Houston

DCS:jam

APR 12 1971

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

HO 157-1210

III. Tangible Results

It is felt that actions of the local authorities and the actions of well-placed informants have neutralized the activities of the PP II in the Houston area, and it is anticipated that this situation will continue in the Houston area.

IV. Development of Counterintelligence Interest

As the Bureau is aware, on 7/26/70, a confrontation occurred between the PP II organization and the Houston Police Department, during which the leader of the PP II was killed. Initially, several black militants were accused of informing to the police and setting up the confrontation. However, during recent weeks through the activities of [redacted] suggestions by the contacting Agent, the blame has shifted to businessmen, pimps and bootleggers and currently they are being blamed for this action because of the fact that PP II cut in on their business when they were active. This apparently is catching hold in the area, and it is anticipated this will continue to be capitalized on through informants in order that a state of distrust and chaos continues to exist as far as the PP II organization is concerned.

FBI

Date: 2/11/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

AIRMAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

FROM: SAC, NEW ORLEANS (105-3138)

COINTELPRO - BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) - DISSENSION
RM

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, 2/2/71.

This is a proposal aimed at creating national dissension.

Dissension in the BPP in the past has apparently resulted from suspicion that members were informants. There has also been evidence of dissension as a result of the sexual promiscuity of the female membership with boyfriends, husbands, etc.

In the present interviews with purged member [redacted], he has advised that members are continually suspicious of each other and quite security conscious. He stated that [redacted] has been suspected as being an informant from time to time because he has missed most of the shoot outs. [redacted] states that most suspicion is directed at those individuals who ask too many questions and appear to be doing more than what their specific assignment is. [redacted] also stated that theft and embezzlement of Panther funds is not condoned except when done with the knowledge of the leadership and by the leadership.

It is therefore suggested that [redacted] be targeted in an effort to give the false impression that he is a FBI informant by placing stories with selected existing informants.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - New Orleans
DWH/bnk
(4)

REC-65

EX-100

2 FEB 13 1971

M Per

RACIAL INT/SECT

105-3138

As a second counterintelligence proposal, it is suggested that a fictitious bank account record be created in the name of HUEY P. NEWTON through an appropriate bank which will cooperate with the Bureau confidentially. A photostat of a false ledger card could be prepared and mailed to national headquarters anonymously along with an appropriate letter condemning NEWTON. The account should show regular sizable deposits over a period of several years and have a sizable balance existing.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2/28/68

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-161140) (P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
IS -

Re Bureau letter, 8/25/67.

Bureau authority is hereby requested to place the following counterintelligence technique into effect:

Anonymous and various other pretext telephone calls will be made to the below-listed subjects for the purpose of disruption, misdirection and to attempt to neutralize and frustrate the activities of these black nationalists.

These calls will be made to the subjects' residence or place of employment.

1. STOKELY CARMICHAEL
(New York File 100-153751)
Residence: 1810 Amethyst Street,
Bronx, New York
(phone 828-9179)
Employment: SNCC Headquarters
100 Fifth Avenue, New York City
(phone YU 9-1313)

REC-52

5-11

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York

UJD:pm
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE.


MAR 6 1968

LATIN-AMERICAN
RACIAL INT. SECT.


Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



NY 100-161140



3. RAP BROWN
(New York File 100-160701)
Residing at 530 Manhattan Avenue,
New York City, with an individual
named WILLIAM HALL
(phone 865-5328)
Employment: National Leader, SNCC,
100 5th Avenue, New York City
(phone YU9-1313)



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: September 17, 1968

FROM: MR. G. C. MOORE

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(UNITY INCORPORATED)

PURPOSE:

To advise of counterintelligence results that kept black nationalist extremist group from receiving \$150,000 grant.

BACKGROUND:

Unity Incorporated operated a black power center in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which included a proposed target range in the basement. The leader of the group was in possession of several pistols. The group applied for a \$150,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation in Pittsburgh.

The Pittsburgh Office has an established source at the Mellon Foundation and recommended advising him of the true nature of Unity Incorporated. This was approved.

RESULTS:

Pittsburgh advised that as a result of this counterintelligence operation Unity Incorporated did not get the \$150,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation. In addition, Unity Incorporated is now defunct.

ACTION:

For information.

(6)

REC-15

12 SEP 19 1968

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 9/2/69

SAC, JACKSON (100-980) (P)

CT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM,
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Re Jackson letters to the Bureau dated
5/27/69, 8/4/69, and 8/26/69.

QUARTERLY PROGRESS LETTER

During the past three months, activities by Black Nationalists at colleges and high schools in Mississippi have been nonexistent since schools, for the most part, have only had activities limited to summer school with small attendance thereat.

[REDACTED] the main Black Nationalist extremist in the Jackson Division, has been restricting his activities to running a liberation school six days a week for children, ages 10 - 14, in the Georgetown ghetto area of Jackson.

[REDACTED] independent extremist, has, except for two-day visit in August, been away from the State of Mississippi since May, 1969. He has been active in other States, especially Pennsylvania, in promoting the "Black Manifesto." In this latter regard, he has presented the Manifesto at churches and before church groups.

Muhammed's Mosque, a Nation of Islam group at Jackson, continues to be attempting to obtain membership and funds in the Jackson area. Their efforts in this regard have been minimal and the leadership is very discouraged.

REC 70

2-80-60-2047
Bureau (CRM) from GDS, Category 2ST-106
Date of Declassification Indefinite
2-80-60-2047
Jackson
(4)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

[REDACTED]

I. OPERATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION

With school commencing in September, 1969, attention will be directed toward Black Nationalist student groups at colleges and high schools in Mississippi for any indications that they are being dominated by black extremists or preaching black extremist activities. Any positive information developed in this regard will be carefully scrutinized for possible counterintelligence actions.

The Jackson Division is continuing to follow closely developments regarding the possible withdrawal of funds from the Jackson Human Rights Project, which is the name given to activities of [REDACTED] and associates in the Jackson area. Any derogatory information developed regarding [REDACTED] which is of public knowledge, will be channelized to appropriate authorities following normal procedure for counterintelligence measure dissemination.

While NOI activities in the State are being closely followed, it is felt that counterintelligence actions at present could possibly serve to unify these elements at a time when they are experiencing serious internal difficulties in the recruiting and finance areas.

[REDACTED]

II. OPERATIONS BEING AFFECTED

III. TANGIBLE RESULTS

(a) The Jackson Division, on July 30 - 31, 1969, conducted a police - community relations two-day seminar at the Jackson Police Department, at which about 65 officers attended. Among topics discussed by FBI instructors were Black Nationalist groups and the fact that police officers should be alert to any criminal activities or acts of violence by Negroes affiliated with black extremist groups.

In the early morning hours of July 31, 1969, two of the officers who attended the session on July 30, 1969, were on duty in a Negro ghetto area of Jackson. They observed three bearded, militant-looking Negroes in an older model Chevrolet cruising in the vicinity of a large gun shop in the ghetto area.

After closely observing this car for a few minutes, it became apparent to the officers that the individuals were "up to no good." They subsequently stopped the car on a traffic violation and thereafter determined that the car was stolen from New Orleans, Louisiana, and that one of the occupants was a convicted felon in possession of a fully-loaded carbine. These three individuals were subsequently identified as being affiliated with the RNA in the New Orleans, Louisiana, area.

The driver of the vehicle was charged with ITSMV and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; one of the passengers was charged with ITSMV and the third passenger was charged with misprison of a felony. All of these charges were Federal charges.

Subsequently, the Negro charged with misprison of a felony was identified from fingerprints at the FBI Identification Division as being identical to [REDACTED], a Federal fugitive from the Pittsburgh Division, sought for almost a year on bank robbery charges.




All of the above three individuals are still in Federal custody in lieu of \$5,000 bond on each charge. Jackson informants in the RNA have been publicizing, discreetly, their "shock and amazement" that such hard core criminal types had been allowed into the RNA, thereby reflecting the RNA in a bad light in the South.


All of the above arrests were given wide dissemination in press releases over local and national news media channels.

(b) In early August 1969 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] contacted the Jackson FBI Office and indicated he was doing a background investigation on [REDACTED] Jackson SNCC leader, and his associates. This investigation was being conducted on behalf of the Episcopal Church in Jackson in that [REDACTED], under the guise of the Jackson Human Rights Project, had received authority for a grant of over \$6,000 for this project. Only about \$2,200 had been actually given to [REDACTED] when Episcopal Church leaders heard rumors that much derogatory information was circulating regarding [REDACTED] and his activities. [REDACTED] asked if the FBI had any information regarding derogatory information concerning [REDACTED] and his associates.

[REDACTED] was referred by the FBI to several police sources, white and black community leaders, and anti-poverty workers who possess information regarding [REDACTED] and his associates, which included [REDACTED] independent extremist, and [REDACTED] at Tougaloo College.

On August 27, 1969,  was contacted and referred by the FBI to an article appearing in "The Jackson Daily News" on the evening of August 26, 1969, which reflected an Associated Press release describing  take-over of a National Student Association Convention at El Paso, Texas, and demanding funds for Negroes at this gathering.  was again most appreciative of this information, said he would research it further, and advise his superiors accordingly.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

DATE: 8/30/68

FROM : SAC, MEMPHIS (100-4542) (P)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Re Memphis letter to Bureau dated 5/22/68.

90-DAY PROGRESS LETTER

I. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION

a) Efforts are continuing by the Memphis Office to place in contact with black power groups at Memphis Negro males who have expressed a willingness to infiltrate the local black power organization at Memphis, Tennessee. In addition, existing Negro informants who have previously reported information regarding NOI activities and other ghetto sources have been contacted and efforts are being made to have these individuals infiltrate the local black power organization known as Black Organizing Project (BOP).

b) Consideration is being given to expanding the policy of contacting responsible leaders of various Negro organizations at Memphis and advising them of the activities and dangerous potential of this Black Organizing Project at Memphis, Tennessee. As set forth hereinafter this counterintelligence operation has been highly successful on the limited scale in which it has been employed at Memphis, Tennessee. It is hoped that such a program of contacting responsible Negro leaders in the various Negro organizations at Memphis will result in the discontinuance of funding by various Negro organizations of the Black Organizing Project, a black power group at Memphis, Tennessee.

(2) - Bureau (RM)
5 - Memphis

(1- 100-4542)

(1- 134-447, BLACPRO)

(1- 157-556, Possible Racial Violence)

(1- 157-999, Black Nationalist Movement)

(1- 157-1067, BOP)

REC-8

EX-100
REC-8

SEP 3 1968

RACIAL INT. SECT.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



c) The Memphis Office continues to maintain daily contact with the Intelligence Unit of the Memphis Police Department and is furnishing all information which might be of value to the Memphis Police Department regarding the activities of individual members of the BOP at Memphis, Tennessee, and the aims and activities of the BOP as an organization. This close liaison has resulted in the arrest of over seven members of BOP at Memphis, Tennessee, during the last 90 days. The furnishing of intelligence information of this nature has resulted in a closer cooperation between the Memphis Police Department and the FBI and has enabled the Memphis Police Department to combat black power extremists in a more successful way.

d) Based on the success to date as set forth hereinafter of the limited divulgence of intelligence information regarding black militant activity at Memphis, Tennessee, to a trusted newspaper source of the Memphis Office, this type of counterintelligence activity is contemplated being increased. By the use of this counterintelligence activity of furnishing to local newspaper sources information regarding local black power activities, numerous articles have been written discrediting the BOP at Memphis, Tennessee. In view of the fact that this information has been furnished to local newspaper sources resulting in no embarrassment to the Bureau and no leak as to the source of this information, the Memphis Office contemplates increasing the amount and scope of the information furnished to these newspaper sources.

II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BEING EFFECTED

a) Interview Program

The Memphis Office is continuing the interview program, making an effort to interview all members of or sympathizers with any black power organization at Memphis, Tennessee. While to date, no informants have been developed as a result of this interview program, it is known that numerous sympathizers of the BOP at Memphis, Tennessee, have discontinued their association and support of this organization as a result of this interview program.

Information has been received from [REDACTED]

at Memphis, to the effect that the FBI's interview program of his people" has resulted in curtailing of income to the BOP and the curtailing of new recruits into his organization.

b) Planned Failure to Interview Known Members of Black Power Organizations

Several of the minor members of the BOP who would logically be interviewed have not been interviewed and this has resulted in a growing suspicion on the part of the members of BOP against these individuals who have not been interviewed. Information has been received indicating that the BOP membership presently considers two of their members as possible police or FBI informants, based on the fact that these two individuals have not been interviewed by the FBI.

c) Furnishing of Information to the Memphis Police Department

The Memphis Office, as mentioned above, is continuing to furnish information regarding BOP leaders and activities at Memphis, Tennessee, to the Intelligence Unit of the Memphis Police Department. This has resulted not only in increased control and policing of the black militants at Memphis, Tennessee, but has improved the relations between the Memphis Police Department and the local FBI Office and has resulted in the FBI's receiving a great deal of information of value developed by the Memphis Police Department regarding the black nationalist movement at Memphis, Tennessee.

d) Leaking of Information to Trusted Liaison Sources and Newspaper Sources

A great deal of information has been furnished to trusted reporters of the local daily newspapers regarding the militant aims and purposes of the BOP at Memphis. This is being expanded due to the success of this operation.

e) The Memphis Office is making known the identity of black militants who are enrolled at the various universities at Memphis, Tennessee, to trusted and reliable sources at these various universities. This has enabled these various universities at Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee, to better control demonstrations on these campuses and has resulted in an increase in information to the FBI regarding these individuals enrolled at these universities.

III. TANGIBLE RESULTS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The interview program is effective based on information received and has been a disruptive agent in BOP activities in the Memphis Division. The deliberate planned failure to interview certain members of this militant organization has also proved to be of value inasmuch as information has been received indicating that members of the BOP are suspicious of two of their own people as possibly being FBI informants based on the fact that they have not been interviewed by the FBI.

The furnishing of selective information to the Memphis Police Department has resulted in the arrest of several BOP members at Memphis, Tennessee. It has also corroborated information received by the Memphis Police Department Intelligence Unit through their own informants and has enabled both the Memphis Police Department and the Memphis FBI Office to more effectively control and check on all sources of information in the racial field.

The most notable success in the counterintelligence program in the Memphis Division has been as a result of information furnished to trusted local newspaper sources. A series of articles has been written concerning the Black Organizing Project (BOP) at Memphis, Tennessee. Based on information furnished by the Memphis Office, these articles have been able to point out the true militancy of this organization and has proved to be a discrediting factor of this black power organization.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE INTEREST

There has developed at Memphis, Tennessee, during the past 90 days a new black militant organization known as the Black Knights and investigation of this new militant organization is being conducted by the Memphis Office. At the present time, these investigative efforts have resulted in the development of a highly placed informant on the Executive Board of this new black power organization and will ultimately result in the identity of all members of this organization at Memphis, Tennessee.

The primary black militant organization at Memphis remains the Black Organizing Project (BOP) which is composed of 5 cells, which are known as the Afro-American Brotherhood (AAB), Black Student Association (BSA), LeMoyne Intercollegiate Chapter of the NAACP, Invaders, and City Organizers. This group, which has received Federal funds under the War on Poverty Committee (WOPC), sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), during this past summer at Memphis, Tennessee, has hopes of continuing funding either by the Federal Government and/or by private foundations. The newspaper publicity afforded this Black Organizing Project (BOP), as a result of information furnished to the local newspapers by the FBI, has resulted in several of the black militants at Memphis, Tennessee, being fired from their positions with this WOPC. It is hoped that enough information can be furnished so that newspaper articles may be written reflecting the militancy of this BOP which will result in the discontinuance of their funding by the Federal Government.

The Memphis Office is remaining alert for any opportunity to disrupt or discredit the black militant organization known as BOP at Memphis, Tennessee, and the Bureau will be kept advised of all developments in this matter.

Memorandum:

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (157-1751) (P*)

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 9/3/69

W. J. [Signature]

Re Los Angeles letter to Bureau, 6/3/69.

For information concerning the counterintelligence program directed against the Black Panther Party (BPP), the Bureau's attention is directed to Los Angeles letters dated 6/3, 6/16, 6/26, 7/16, 7/25, 7/30 and 8/26/69. In accordance with Bureau instructions, the counterintelligence operations against the BPP are not being set forth in this letter.

1. Operations Under Consideration

The Los Angeles Office continually follows the violations of the anti-riot and gun control laws by black nationalists looking toward prosecution of these individuals under Federal and State statutes.

A continuing survey of the telephone toll calls of various black nationalist leaders is being made under existing Bureau policy to determine what counterintelligence programs might be put into effect.

2. Operations Being Effectuated

The interview program within the black nationalist movement is being continued on a regular basis and this has caused some concern and disruption among the members.

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - Los Angeles

REC-80

100-448006 - 125

EX-103

SEP 5 1969

[Signature]

8 SEP 15 1969

LA 157-1751

3. Tangible Results

The membership of the "US" organization has dropped approximately 50 per cent, which is believed to be due in part to the interview program.

4. Developments of Counterintelligence Interest

It has been noted that RON KARENGA, head of the "US" organization, has moved his residence three times within the past five months to avoid harassment by the police and possibly to avoid a confrontation with the BPP. Consideration is being given by the Los Angeles Office as to what benefit could be derived through a counterintelligence program of making known KARENGA's current address to the Police Department and possibly to rival black nationalist groups.

FBI

Date: 3/25/68

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

AIRMAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MOBILE

MARTIN LUTHER KING
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

ReBuTelCall to me 3/12/68, and BuRad 3/21/68.

I have considered this matter, discussed it with appropriate agent and supervisory personnel of the Mobile Office and the following is proposed as a counterintelligence move on KING's Washington Spring Project.

KING has quite a following in and around the Selma, Ala. area and has appeared recently in Selma on one occasion at the church of [REDACTED] who, at the time of KING's appearance [REDACTED] was tentatively endorsed by KING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Negro community in the Selma area, [REDACTED] and informed sources indicate [REDACTED] more or less contributed to the [REDACTED] has been known to make derogatory remarks concerning KING and was allegedly miffed that KING did not advise him [REDACTED] of his, KING's, contemplated visit to Selma.

In view of the above, it is felt that if some method can be devised whereby [REDACTED] can be advised of certain items relative to the Washington Spring Project, he would take action to discourage individuals from participating therein.

③ - Bureau
-- Mobile
WMA:And

REGISTERED

REC 43

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE.

APR 4 1968

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

It is not believed that [redacted] could be contacted by a Bureau Agent, although he has on occasion furnished us information which has proven to be reliable.

It is, therefore, proposed that an anonymous letter be directed to [redacted] wherein it is called to the attention of [redacted] that KING is merely using the Negroes of the Selma area for his own personal aggrandizement; that he is not genuinely interested in their welfare, but only in their donations; that in all probability the individuals going to Washington for the Spring Project will be left stranded without suitable housing or food. The letter should also play up the possibility of violence, particularly the fact that although CARMICHAEL and BROWN of SNCC have a so-called gentlemen's agreement with KING not to take over this action, there exists a strong possibility that such will occur. There is also the possibility of RAM and NOI taking over the project since it lacks organization and direction. The letter should also point out that KING was in Alabama on about 3/21/68, and did not make his schedule in the Selma and adjoining counties area, which was another indication that KING was talking out of both sides of his mouth.

It is felt that this letter should be mailed from either Washington or Baltimore since, if the letter is mailed from anywhere in the south, [redacted] may feel it is the work of the Klan or some other racist group. It is felt that Baltimore would probably be the best since a letter from Washington would indicate the possibility of the government doing this.

Simultaneous with mailing the letter from Baltimore, it is proposed that a copy of the letter to [redacted] together with a cover letter, be mailed to [redacted]. The cover letter should indicate that attached was a letter directed to [redacted] and that he, [redacted] might want to contact [redacted] relative to [redacted] receipt of the letter and what it said.

The thought behind this is to give [redacted] a chance to interview [redacted] concerning receipt of the letter and thereby create a news story which could legitimately be published and read by the Negro community in the Selma area. It is known that the [redacted] has a large circulation among the Negro community in Dallas and adjoining counties and has taken a rather liberal attitude in connection with civil-rights movements.

By handling as above, we would eliminate the possibility of these rumors being attributed to the FBI.

Consideration has been given to some method of discouraging [redacted] for KING's project, and [redacted] and other portions of Alabama. From our contact with [redacted] who is a liaison source, it is the opinion of contacting agents that he is so sold on the project that it is almost impossible to disillusion him.

It is also felt that some method of getting an article in the "Southern Courier" along the lines of the above would have a discouraging effect on the Negro community in and around Montgomery, Ala., since the Courier is very widely read. Consideration is being given to the method of accomplishing this.

The Bureau is requested to consider the proposal set forth above and advise.

FBI

Date: 2/17/71

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

A I R T E L

A I R M A I L

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (157-601)

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO - BLACK EXTREMISTS
RM

The Bureau has been advised that the BPP is presently negotiating for the manufacture of some 30,000 wrist watches to be produced in three models showing the photo of HUEY P. NEWTON, or BOBBY SEALE, or ELDRIDGE CLEAVER on the face of the watch and having the wording "Seize The Time" instead of numerals. The BPP is utilizing the project in an attempt to raise cash and obviously plans on selling these watches at a price far above their cost of \$5.50 each.

...In an attempt to discourage the sale of these watches at an inflated price and cut the Party's revenue, San Francisco suggests the following letter be expeditiously prepared at the Laboratory on BPP stationery and supposedly signed by HUEY NEWTON. It is requested that some 40 copies of the letter be printed and forwarded to the San Francisco Division in order that they can be mailed to all presently active BPP and NCCF chapters. San Francisco will mail these letters from Oakland, California.

The proposed letter is as follows:

EX-114

REC-88

100-448106-2279

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - San Francisco

LGB/jr

FEB 15 1971

Approved: _____

Sent _____

M

Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

SF 157-601

LSB/jr

"To all Chapters of the Black Panther
Party and the National Committee to
Combat Fascism

"I wish to announce I have invented a new
wristwatch that will shortly be placed on the
market.

"The watch will have a distinctive arm band
and will be made in three styles. One style will
feature on the face of the watch the photo of
your Supreme Commander, another style will feature
a photo of brother Eldridge Cleaver and a third
copy will feature on the face a photo of Bobby
Seale. These watches will be sold throughout the
country but they will first be made available to
all Black Panther Party members, community workers,
NCCF associates, and our friends at absolute cost.
The Huey P. Newton model will sell for \$5.50, the
Cleaver and Seale models will be offered to you
for \$4.50.

"These watches will later be offered to the
general public at a much higher price. Tell your
friends to obtain our new Black Panther Party
watches through you at rock bottom prices. Please
advise National how many of your members and friends
desire to purchase such a watch and furnish us the
particular model desired.

"Huey P. Newton
Supreme Commander"